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Historically, organizations are frequently thought to be concerned with the maximization of 
profits and value, and the corresponding efficiency concerns regarding optimization of 
resources introduce agency costs and the need for management control (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). With agency theory as the prevailing foundation for analytical budgeting and control 
models within an economic research tradition, management accounting researchers have 
studied incentives, contracts, and alternative budget practices (Covaleski et al., 2003). The 
sociological research tradition has been more concerned with the influence of budgeting on 
decision-making and political processes within organizations (Covaleski et al., 2003). Common 
for most of the budgeting research in the past is the interest in handling uncertainty and directing 
effort toward the goals of the owner or organization. 
Criticisms towards budgeting as a useful control mechanism abound (Bunce et al., 1995; 
Hope & Fraser, 2003; Wallander, 1999). Although the problems of budgeting appear to be 
commonly recognized (e.g., Hansen et al., 2003), the solutions are not. According to Otley 
(2006), organizations either acknowledge budgetary limitations and continue to use them, adapt 
their budgetary practices to changing environments and improve them, or attempt to radically 
change (or disregard) budgeting altogether. The most radical approach has come to be known 
as Beyond Budgeting (BB). Although many organizations find budgets to be flawed, most firms 
continue to use them, albeit in altered configurations (Libby & Lindsay, 2010). 
The central topic in this doctoral dissertation is efforts to improve budgeting and 
management control in contemporary organizations. Although the setting in the empirical 
papers is organizations inspired by the BB philosophy, the dissertation seeks to take a wider 
look at budgeting practices overall, challenges with changing budgeting practices, as well as 





I have chosen the topic of dynamic management control for several reasons. First, I wrote my 
master thesis on Beyond Budgeting1 and was inspired to do more research in general, and on 
BB and contemporary management control in particular. Second, although the literature on 
budgeting and the behavioral problems it brings about is vast (Covaleski et al., 2003) and deep-
rooted (Argyris, 1952, 1953; Caplan, 1966), much is yet to be learned about how organizations 
deal with human interaction, autonomy, efficiency, flexibility, and control. Studying 
organizations that are experimenting with novel approaches to management control seemed an 
opportunity too good to pass up. 
1.2. Structure of the Doctoral Dissertation 
As part of a broad research project on contemporary management control and budgeting, the 
dissertation contains three articles that cover different aspects of the subject matter. Chapter 1 
is a literature review seeking to bring together two diverging streams of research. Chapter 2 
develops the concept of hope in changing management control practices, whereas Chapter 3 
investigates the design and use of enabling control in a Beyond Budgeting setting. 
The overarching research question this dissertation seeks to answer is: 
What are the consequences of various (non-)budgeting initiatives for research, 
management control practice, and management accountants? 
In turn, this research theme guides the three interrelated research papers that set out to answer: 
(1) What are the problems and proposed solutions with budgeting and management control, 
and how may budgeting research be further advanced as a unified research area? 
 
1 Published as SNF-report 06/12: Beyond Budgeting and ownership – A qualitative study of how a 




(2) How can hope be further conceptualized and understood in the context of changing 
management control practice, and what role does hope play for management 
accountants in reframing ideals and sustaining action? 
(3) How do managers and employees make sense of control elements with enabling 
design characteristics? 
As the dissertation sets out to explore how different views on budgeting lead to different 
practices of management control and system configurations, the thesis is anchored in budgeting 
as a central component of management control. Still, the investigations of wildly diverging 
practices, and the broad scope of the thesis, lead the research through an assortment of 
theoretical fields such as theology, pastoral psychology, and self-management. The excursion 
through such a diverse set of theories plays a part in describing and understanding the plethora 
of consequences resulting from different budgeting and management control initiatives. 
1.3. Structure of the Introductory Chapter 
In the next section of this introductory chapter, I provide some contextual structure to the 
dissertation by offering an overview of the literature that inspired this research. In section 3, I 
present the methodological foundations and choices for the papers in the dissertation, before 
section 4 briefly presents and discusses the articles. Finally, the three papers are appended in 
their entirety, and together with this first introductory chapter constitute the full dissertation. 
2. Methodological Foundations and Choices 
Doing qualitative accounting research in an interpretivist tradition implicates some ontological 
assumptions about reality consisting of context-dependent social constructs (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2006). Even though the ontological position suggests a subjective and socially 
constructed reality, the social and economic concerns are intricately intertwined (Granovetter, 




methodological approach. The approach views management control as part of an organization 
that is affecting and affected by, the social context within which it is situated (Burchell et al., 
1980). Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al. (2008) refer to this as interpretive research “straddling between 
paradigms”, including both subjectivist and objectivist features where both the emic and etic 
perspective helps construct meaning about social practice (Lukka & Modell, 2010). 
The dissertation consists of three papers: one mixed method literature review, and two 
case studies. The literature review seeks to identify similarities and differences in budgeting 
and Beyond Budgeting research to bring the two literatures closer together for conceptual 
clarity. The first empirical paper is a conceptual modeling of hope in accounting, and the case 
is used to empirically illustrate the arguments put forward in the conceptual development. 
Finally, the last paper is an empirical investigation of the operationalization of self-management 
in a bank. This study is oriented towards the individual actors in the organization and their use 
and perceptions of control elements that are intended to be enabling. 
3. Presentation and Discussion of the Articles in this Thesis 
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the three articles included in this dissertation. 
Because each of the three papers speaks for itself, only a brief summary of each paper is 
presented. Further, supplementary clarifications identify the linkages between the articles to 
offer a theoretically and thematically coherent argumentation for how various (non)budgeting 
initiatives have consequences for contemporary management control practice. 
3.1. Article 1: Budgeting, and Beyond – Towards a Theoretical Foundation for 
Beyond Budgeting Research 
As novel budgeting and management accounting techniques and philosophies, such as Zero-
base budgeting (ZBB), Activity-based budgeting (ABB), and Beyond Budgeting (BB) make 




the perceived problems with traditional budgeting (Bunce et al., 1995; Hansen et al., 2003; 
Hope & Fraser, 2003). The focus is on the inefficiencies and irrelevance of budgeting, and the 
new concept highlights how it is different from traditional budgeting (TB), without necessarily 
reflecting on previous research into similar issues (Covaleski et al., 2003). Consequently, as a 
research area, BB is vague and ambiguous. There is no clear definition of what BB actually is, 
except that it is (purportedly) different from traditional budgeting (Nguyen et al., 2018). 
To date, BB research lacks conceptual clarity due to the confusing tenets of BB and lack 
of historical situation within a broader research area of budgeting and management control. 
Research in the nexus between traditional budgeting and BB is hindered due to the desire to 
distance BB from budgeting. Thus, the first paper in this dissertation aims to situate the 
investigation of (non-)budget initiatives in a long history of budgeting and management control 
research, well beyond the scope employed by budget critics and BB propagators, by conducting 
a systematic literature review of all budgeting research over the last half-century. 
As most BB research is concerned with the dissimilarities to budgeting (e.g., Hope & 
Fraser, 2003; Wallander, 1995), this paper departs from a more pragmatic point of view, where 
research on novel management accounting techniques and philosophies is grounded in the 
wider historical context of budgeting research, which is arguably one of the most central areas 
of research within management control over the last century (Covaleski et al., 2003). The 
behavioral issues in budgeting date back to the mid-20th century when Argyris (1952, 1953) set 
out to study the role of budgets for human behavior and vice versa. 
With the review going back a little over 50 years, only a limited number of top academic 
journals in accounting existed2 at the outset of this review period. Considering the low number 
of academic accounting journals 50 years back, the review thus includes most academic 
 
2 In fact, only five of the journals included in this literature review existed in 1968 (to which the search 




research on budgeting that is easily accessible by searching in large databases. This mixed-
method literature review primarily employs the Scopus3 database to analyze a large amount of 
peer-reviewed accounting literature concerning the behavioral aspects of budgeting practice. 
The paper sets out to address the following research question: 
What are the problems and proposed solutions with budgeting and management control, 
and how may budgeting research be further advanced as a unified research area? 
The review identifies both behavioral and coordination problems with budgeting. Specifically, 
the review uncovers the importance of facilitating thoughtful exchanges of ideas in 
organizations seeking to improve their control practices and facilitate participation and 
decentralization. The review concludes that rather than seeking out the one perfect solution, 
organizations should seek to identify the control practices that work for their context, structure, 
and employees. This opens up for research on what happens in organizations where change 
initiatives fail to materialize according to plan, which is dealt with in the two empirical papers. 
3.2. Article 2: Dealing with Setbacks – The Role of Hope in Changing 
Management Control Practice 
The second paper in my thesis develops the concept of hope in the accounting literature and 
explains how management control change proceeds, despite numerous setbacks. The article 
seeks to answer two research questions: 
First, how can hope be further conceptualized and understood in the context of changing 
management control practice? And second, what role does hope play for management 
accountants in reframing ideals and sustaining action? 
The paper develops a conceptual model of hope to demonstrate how management control 
 




change unfolds and influences the practices of accountants. The conceptual model is then 
applied to an illustrative empirical case. The empirical part of the paper addresses a major 
organizational change aimed at increasing management accounting relevance and the 
development of new control practices in MailCo. The change contains a promise of revitalizing 
management control practice in the organization, specifically the role of accountants as future-
oriented business partners in value-creating activities. 
The change initiative was based on ideas from the Beyond Budgeting (BB) philosophy 
(Hope & Fraser, 2003; Wallander, 1999), where the ideal4 is to manage organizations and 
organizational actors on different parameters, with less (to no) emphasis on annual budgets. 
Continuous setbacks in MailCo’s efforts to change its control practices do not stop the 
organization from moving forward, even when they fail to achieve what they set out to do. 
We contribute to the literature on hope and its relationship to control practices (Catasús 
et al., 2016; Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016), especially regarding the introduction of new 
management control models, by providing a theoretical model and an empirical illustration of 
how management accountants in MailCo create hope for themselves and the rest of the 
organization, even as they realize that the transformation is not unfolding according to plan. 
In addition, our findings provide new insights into the management control practice 
literature (Becker, 2014; Becker et al., 2020; Goretzki et al., 2013; Henttu-Aho, 2016) by 
showing how the concept of hope relates to organizational transformation and new control 
practices. Unsuccessful attempts at changing institutionalized practices do not necessarily result 
in reinforcement of the old practices, instead, mechanisms of hope drive the change initiative 
forward, if only incrementally so. Hope is an instrumental feature of resilient change initiatives, 
 
4 According to Merriam-Webster (n.d.), an ideal is a standard of perfection and “something that one 
hopes or intends to accomplish”. An idea can be a synonym to an ideal, but ideas are also defined as 
“plans for action”. The conception of “ideal-types of management” dates back to Max Weber (1958) 




and through forgiveness and forgetfulness (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016) learning and action 
contribute to the survival of the ideal. 
3.3. Article 3: Enabling Whom? – The Design and Use of Enabling Control 
The final article in the dissertation investigates the design and use of enabling control elements 
in a highly decentralized organization. The research question we proceed to answer is: 
How do managers and employees make sense of control elements with enabling design 
characteristics? 
Our research provides evidence of situations in which the proposed decentralization of 
responsibility and empowerment of employees is rejected, as some employees are indeed 
satisfied with “stricter” and less flexible boundary conditions. Not all employees (even though 
they qualify as “knowledge workers”) have a desire to become (self-)leaders of any sort, and 
many express that self-management requires more work. Rather, the employees in our study 
find safety and clarity in knowing ex-ante what is expected of them, with the added benefit of 
relying on others (i.e., managers) for improvement work and strategic thinking. 
We contribute to the debate on enabling controls (e.g., Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; 
Cuganesan & Free, 2020; Jordan & Messner, 2012; O’Grady, 2019; Wouters & Wilderom, 
2008) by illustrating how enabling design characteristics may be perceived as coercive at an 
employee level. 
Further, we demonstrate how insights from the organization literature may inform 
management accounting. To our knowledge, Van der Kolk et al. (2020) is the only other 
empirical paper studying the operationalization of self-management and control. Similar to 
previous studies of self-managed teams (e.g., Barker, 1993), we find that individual self-





3.4. Summary of the Thesis 
  Paper 1  Paper 2  Paper 3 
Purpose  Identify common themes 
around issues with budgeting 
and corresponding proposed 
solutions, from a Beyond 
Budgeting (BB) perspective, 
to assist in providing a 
theoretical foundation for BB 
research as part of the wider 
traditional budgeting (TB) 
literature. 
 Develop the concept of hope 
in accounting, and explain 
how management control 
change proceeds, despite 
numerous setbacks. 
 Study the design and use of 
enabling controls in a 
radically decentralized 
organizational setting. 
       
Research 
Question 
 What are the problems and 
proposed solutions with 
budgeting and management 
control, and how may 
budgeting research be further 
advanced as a unified 
research area? 
 1. How can hope be further 
conceptualized and 
understood in the context of 
changing management 
control practice? 2. What role 
does hope play for 
management accountants in 
reframing ideals and 
sustaining action? 
 How do managers and 
employees make sense of 
control elements with 
enabling design 
characteristics? 
       
Method  Mixed method literature 
review 
 Conceptual paper with 
empirical illustrations 
 Case study 
       
Findings  BB is part of wider budgeting 
research, and rather than 
distancing itself from TB, it 
should draw on extant 
literature to improve 
budgeting in contemporary 
organizations. 
 Hope drives organizational 
transformation and new 
control practices. Hope is an 
instrumental feature of 
resilient change initiatives 
and contributes to the 
survival of ideals. 
 Enabling controls may, in 
certain circumstances, be 
perceived as coercive. 
Swings between coercive and 
enabling may co-exist across 
individuals and hierarchical 
levels simultaneously. 
       
Contribution  Merging BB and TB research 
will improve the theoretical 
foundation for BB research. 
Acknowledging previous 
attempts to deal with 
budgetary problems will 
leave BB researchers with 
promising avenues for further 
research, such as the study of 
hindsight in performance 
evaluation. 
 Provide a theoretical model 
for understanding change and 
the generativity of hope as an 
emotion of elation. Hope 
enables the imaginations of a 
better future, and 
management accountants can 
drive changes forward as 
agents of hope. 
 We contribute to the 
enabling/coercive literature 
by providing evidence of an 
organization that 
decentralizes control beyond 
the managerial level and 
distributes control elements 
to employees at an individual 
level. 
The first article showed us that efforts to improve budgeting are plentiful but that the correct 
way to balance autonomy and control eludes both managers and researchers. Attempts to 
change control practices include radical decentralization, empowerment, and increased 
participation. Although participation is proven to reduce slack (e.g., Fisher et al., 2000), the 




participation, job involvement, and organizational commitment are correlated, but what are the 
boundaries of participation? 
The third paper in this dissertation investigates an extreme case of participation, where 
employees are supposed to be self-managed and thus participating in managerial activities 
previously reserved for middle management. This is one example of research into how 
budgeting alternatives work (or fail) in contemporary organizations that are experimenting with 
new approaches to performance management and control. 
The second paper in this dissertation investigated the role of hope and the importance 
of emotions of elation in bringing about radical change in organizations. Although change is 
desired, setbacks occur, and the generative powers of hope allow change initiatives to move 
forward, even though ambitions are not immediately met. This helps explain how novel control 
practices are initiated and revised, via the adroit participation of hopeful change agents. 
4. What Have We Learned? 
This final section of the introductory chapter briefly connects the dots between the three papers, 
addresses the key takeaways from the thesis overall, and ultimately lifts the discussion to a 
more general level for management control researchers and practitioners alike to highlight what 
we can learn from the research project in general. 
The dissertation argues (Paper 1) that even though Beyond Budgeting (BB) is often 
distanced from traditional budgeting (TB) research, it is clearly a part of the same general 
discourse, especially when it comes to the study of control and behavior. When theorizing BB, 
we find that there is little novelty in what BB addresses but that BB, like TB, is chiefly 
concerned with the development of alternative management and control mechanisms in 




Because of the lack of novelty, one might be tempted to ask whether BB is merely a 
futile attempt at rebranding old ideas, but the second paper in this thesis shows that is not the 
case. Uncertainty and ambiguity lead efforts to change control practices to be difficult and 
challenging. Attempts to improve control practices are often set back in their development and 
implementation. Uncertainty creates space for organizational actors to make promises about the 
future (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016) that appeal to the imagination of their colleagues (Carlsen 
et al., 2011). The envisioning of a better future creates hope, and the generative power of hope 
(Ludema et al., 1997) helps to drive change initiatives forward. In that regard, BB has been 
fairly successful in creating space for contemporary organizations to experiment with novel 
control practices. Even though the practitioner discourse often departs from criticism of 
traditional budgeting, BB propagators should acknowledge that the BB philosophy is only able 
to exist in the space created by the ambiguity and incompleteness in control practices. Busco 
and Quattrone (2018) discussed how the search for perfection is prompted and sustained by 
ambiguity and incompleteness, and we illustrate the role of hope in this ongoing search, even 
when failure is looming. 
After recognizing the intricacies of control change at an organizational level, the third 
paper in this dissertation introduces a fresh empirical phenomenon to the control literature, 
namely self-management. The improvement of control systems and practices is mostly studied 
at an organizational level but in this paper, we investigated the consequences of taking BB 
seriously and decentralizing decision making as well as performance measurement and control 
to individual employees. The paper seeks to improve our understanding of how self-
management is operationalized in practice, and whether it is truly possible to design enabling 
controls. Enabling design characteristics are perceived differently at the managerial and 
operational levels of the case organization, and we illustrate how organizational actors make 




Overall, the dissertation is rooted in the wider behavioral budgeting and control 
literature, where efforts to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity (e.g., March, 1987; Quattrone, 
2017) are discussed. Novel management control practices (such as BB) are allowed to thrive 
because decisions and promises are flexibly and favorably evaluated through revising the past 
(Brunsson, 1993; Capps, 1995; Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). The thesis highlights the role of 
hope in overcoming setbacks through resilient ideals that allows ideas to be updated and drive 
change initiatives forward. Further, the dissertation illustrates the construction of meaning in 
an organization that decentralizes the discretion of control elements to an individual level. The 
potentiality of new technologies to provide performance data to individual employees opens up 
for interpretations of such representations, and it is up to the organizational actors to construct 
credible stories about past performance and future ideals that sustains action (Brunsson, 2009; 
Ludema et al., 1997; Quattrone, 2017). 
For practitioners, the essence in this dissertation may be summarized in some seemingly 
grand (yet commonsensical) conclusions. First, labels do not matter. Whether it is called 
Beyond Budgeting, better budgeting, advanced budgeting, decentralized management control, 
or something else is of little importance. What matters is that all processes to improve control 
practices (and thus budgeting) are ever ongoing and in constant evolution. The implication is 
that one will never be “done”, and systems will always entail incompleteness which leads 
reforms to become the norm. Practitioners must not only settle with accepting that 
incompleteness, uncertainty, and ambiguity will always be part of (organizational) life, but 
moreover, embrace the opportunities for affecting the future through envisioning better futures 
and imparting hope in organizations. The best contemporary controllers can do is work to 
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The objective of this paper is to identify common themes around issues with budgeting 
and corresponding proposed solutions, from a Beyond Budgeting (BB) perspective, to 
assist in providing a theoretical foundation for BB research as part of the wider budgeting 
literature. A mixed method literature review is conducted, consisting of a preliminary 
eclectic review which scopes a broader, systematic review on budget criticism and 
proposed solutions. In contrast to other literature reviews, this paper demonstrates how 
BB may find conceptual clarity in looking to “traditional budgeting” (TB) research, rather 
than actively distancing itself from it. The paper demonstrates how budgeting research 
has always been concerned with the behavioral consequences of budgeting. Furthermore, 
it is argued that a more constructive approach for theoretical development in BB is to see 
the two literatures as one and construct knowledge from both streams. By drawing on TB 
research, BB researchers may find theoretical footing for further research on the role of 
slack and participation in organizations seeking to improve budgeting and control 
processes. The review also uncovers that the role of hindsight in performance evaluation 
is one of the more promising avenues for further budgeting research. Finally, the paper 
illustrates how a combination of eclectic and systematic review methodologies allows 
researchers to broaden the scope to extensive literatures, to synthesize common themes 
and directions for future research over many years to avoid the potential 
compartmentalization that arises from conceptual divergence over time. 







Budgeting is one of the most prominent planning and control tools in organizations and has 
been so for more than half a century, which leads it to be “one of the most extensively 
researched topics in management accounting” (Covaleski et al., 2003, p. 4). Budgeting is about 
predicting the future, allocating resources, motivating and incentivizing employees, managing 
performance, evaluating effort, and controlling people and organizations (e.g., Covaleski et al., 
2003; Libby & Lindsay, 2010). The budgeting process (budgeting) is wider than the end 
product (the budget) and involves both human and organizational action, as well as reactions 
and interactions on many dimensions (Covaleski et al., 2003). In this paper, budgeting is 
classified as a performance management system (PMS), in which budgeting is about more than 
the accounting numbers – it is also about the process and behavior. 
The extensive body of budgeting research leads to an emergence of different budgeting 
research thrusts, each built on different theoretical foundations. According to Covaleski et al. 
(2003), most budgeting research is informed by economics, psychology, and sociology and, as 
budgeting researchers become more influenced by non-budgeting research in their choice of 
theoretical perspective, budgeting research has grown apart. In the process of simplifying 
within a theoretical perspective, researchers may “forget” (see Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016) 
about certain complex relationships, and later seek to advance the literature within “issues that 
were previously simplified away” (Covaleski et al., 2003, p. 4). 
In this paper, I consider two apparently opposing literatures on budgeting. Traditional 
budgeting (TB) research is about improving the budget process to optimize effort and 
performance (Covaleski et al., 2003). Beyond Budgeting (BB) is a practice-driven concept that 
has emerged over the last two decades, and is receiving increasing recent attention (Nguyen et 
al., 2018). BB is often claimed to be built on a different set of assumptions about humans 




seen as a critique towards traditional annual budgets where the ultimate goal in BB is to abandon 
budgets altogether (Wallander, 1999). 
In addition, research on BB is argued to be fragmented, mainly empirical and 
explorative (Nguyen et al., 2018), and a unified understanding of the concept is lacking. Finally, 
researchers have been concerned about some of the vagueness and internal inconsistencies in 
BB which remain unanswered in both practitioner and academic literature (Frow et al., 2010), 
and the concept is not maturing and homogenizing in the same manner other management 
accounting innovations have done previously (Granlund & Lukka, 1998). 
Based on this apparent separation in the literature, this paper seeks to answer how 
budgeting research may be further advanced by identifying problems and proposed solutions 
with budgeting and management control. Particularly, the paper seeks to identify how BB and 
TB research may be more integrated, in a unified thrust towards a less divorced literature. To 
answer this research question, we first have to identify some of the central issues within 
budgeting. Then, we can identify areas in TB from which BB can depart on its quest to theorize 
about budget alternatives beyond issues that are already addressed in TB literature. 
To answer the research question, I perform a mixed method literature review. I study 
both TB and BB and show how an open-minded approach towards the issues raised in both 
literatures strengthens the theoretical potential of BB research. The review departs from 
criticisms and problems with budgeting and shows where the literatures converge and where 
they diverge. The first part of the review consists of a traditional eclectic review in which I 
identify some of the critiques and proposed solutions to budget shortcomings. Building on these 
themes, I then conduct a structured review of more than 50 years of budgeting research to 





The review is structured around behavioral and coordination problems and recognizes 
an array of behavioral and organizational solutions to these problems. Rather than taking a 
contrarian position towards budgeting, I argue that traditional budgeting research may improve 
our understanding of BB by providing a theoretical foundation from which to analyze 
fundamental similarities and differences. 
The starting point in BB research is that traditional budgeting is flawed, riddled with 
problems such as gaming, myopia, and inflexibility (Hansen et al., 2003; Van der Stede, 2000). 
For example, there are many insights in TB research about participation and slack that is 
transferable to BB research. Much of TB research has studied relative and collective 
performance measures, and I argue that by building on this insight, BB research will be able to 
generate new knowledge. For instance, Brüggen and Luft (2011) found that relative 
performance measures may increase misrepresentation and gaming behavior. This insight is 
valuable to BB researchers as they further explore relative performance measures coupled with 
hindsight and subjective adjustments post-hoc. 
Similarly, the well-established literature on participation (e.g., Onsi, 1973) offers an 
excellent basis for supplementary studies on employee empowerment. Certain features (such as 
the motivating aspects of self-determination and the potential for rhetoric and ritualistic 
participation/empowerment) will be comparable, whereas others (such as the role of hindsight) 
may be different and worthy of further investigation and theorization. 
The review offers three contributions to extant research on budgeting (Covaleski et al., 
2003; Nguyen et al., 2018). First, it offers some words of caution concerning the potentially 
detrimental divide between BB and TB. Second, the study highlights some of the overlap 
between TB and BB literature by identifying a number of problems with budgeting and 
endeavors to deal with these issues. Third, the study suggests some directions for future 




demonstrates how a mix of eclectic and systematic reviews may assist in driving accounting 
research forward. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the review 
methodology, describing the data sampling strategy. Section 3 opens with the eclectic review 
on behavioral budgeting research that frames the subsequent systematic review. Further, the 
systematic review considers more than 50 years of budgeting research and compares and 
contrasts TB and BB literature, before a concluding discussion with avenues for further research 
is presented in section 4. 
2. Review Methodology 
Initially, I set out to conduct a systematic literature review of traditional budgeting research by 
departing from a recent literature review on BB (Nguyen et al., 2018). Systematic reviews are 
methodical, transparent and reproducible, and are considered a rigorous method for 
investigating what works (Gough, 2015; Tranfield et al., 2003). 
However, systematic reviews have been criticized for their usefulness in theory-
building (Gough et al., 2012), and that they tend to be mechanistic in nature. As the study 
progressed, it became evident that a more informed entry than a pure departure from BB 
literature would benefit the research objective. I decided to start with behavioral budget 
criticism in a broader sense and adhere to a different approach, namely a mixed method review 
(Gough, 2015). The combination of a more eclectic review, together with a systematic review, 
has been suggested as a better way to investigate not just what does (not) work, but also why it 
does (not) work (Gough et al., 2012). The mixed method review integrates the flexibility and 
breadth of a traditional eclectic review with some of the more rigorous characteristics of a 




The eclectic review broadly investigates behavioral budgeting literature on a journey 
towards defining a set of concepts, themes, and research thrusts to systematically examine in 
the succeeding systematic review. The eclectic review focuses on problems with budgeting, 
proposed solutions, and consequences for PMS design and use. Ultimately, the eclectic review 
serves as a scoping study that defines inclusion and exclusion criteria, as well as research 
objectives for the impending systematic literature review. 
The objective of the systematic review is to identify commonalities and discrepancies 
in TB and BB literature around identical or similar concepts, and ultimately to bring these 
literatures closer together in an attempt to build on previous knowledge and advance our 
understanding of performance management in complex organizations and dynamic 
environments. As Massaro et al. (2016, p. 795) concluded, structured reviews are a way of 
“developing research agendas that critique and build upon ‘the shoulders of giants’”. 
A search was performed in the Scopus1 database, with a specific search string (see 
Appendix C), where I searched for all variations of budget (such as budgeting, budgets, 
budgetary, etc.) in titles, keywords, and abstracts. Bearing in mind the importance of titles, 
keywords, and abstracts, which are all carefully written by the author, it may be argued that 
these data points will represent an overview of the most salient themes in a given article. The 
search included all accounting journals on levels 3 and 4 of the ABS-list2, as well as four 
individually selected level 2 journals3 with a history of publishing (beyond) budgeting research. 
In total, there are 27 journals on levels 3 and 4, and with AMA, JAOC, JMAR, and QRAM, a 
total of 31 journals were included in the search (see Appendix A). Not all journals are covered 
 
1 www.scopus.com is the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature. 
2 The ABS-list, also known as the Academic Journal Guide, is a recognized journal ranking system 
used primarily by business schools. 
3 Advances in Management Accounting (AMA), Journal of Accounting and Organizational Change 
(JAOC), Journal of Management Accounting Research (JMAR), and Qualitative Research in 




in Scopus, and additional searches were conducted in other databases such as JSTOR, 
EBSCOhost, Emerald Insight, and ProQuest. 
In total, close to 28,000 articles were published by the journals included in the selected 
journals over the designated period, and the findings will obviously be limited by the search 
strategy. The search goes back more than 50 years, from 1968-2020, and 1,005 articles were 
identified at the onset of the review. Earlier research papers often did not have abstracts or 
keywords, which means unless the paper has a variation of budget in the title, it will 
automatically be excluded from the sample. In the earlier periods, there were also significantly 
fewer journals. The total number of articles published in the selected outlets has increased 
steadily year-over-year thus biasing findings somewhat towards more recent research (see 
Appendix D for development of publications per year). In the selection of relevant research, I 
still attempted to select research across the entire period. 
Employing inclusion and exclusion criteria4 based on the eclectic review (next section), 
as well as a few cross-references and citation checks (Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018), I reduced 
the number of research papers included in further analyses from 1,005 to 76. The reduction 
involved importing all the abstracts to Excel and Word where a set of search and classification 
strategies were employed. For example, searching for participat* returns all abstracts in which 
variations of participation (participate, participated, participatory, etc.) are present. After 
reading and categorizing abstracts according to the findings in the eclectic review, the 
systematic review presents an overview of research themes within behavioral budgeting 
research that may help BB researchers in their theorizing efforts going forward. 
 
4 Excluding papers about e.g., capital budgeting and line-item budgeting, and including papers about 




3. Literature Review 
3.1. Eclectic Literature Review 
Considering that this paper aims to identify common themes around issues with budgeting and 
corresponding proposed solutions in a BB perspective, the review is two-fold. First, a 
traditional, more eclectic review is performed, where common themes and research thrusts in 
the TB and BB literature are identified and synthesized. Second, a subsequent systematic review 
offers an extensive overview of problems and proposed solutions within a wide array of 
budgeting literature. This eclectic review thus results in a framework within which to perform 
a more structured and systematic literature review. 
The objective of this eclectic review is to identify thematic research thrusts within 
management control systems and performance management systems literature, with a particular 
emphasis on problems with budgeting, proposed solutions, and consequences for PMSs. 
The eclectic review consists of predominantly scientific review articles in the field of 
behavioral, organizational, and sociological accounting research (e.g., Birnberg & Shields, 
1989; Covaleski et al., 2003; Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018; Hansen et al., 2003; Nguyen et al., 
2018), but also a number of seminal research articles and books on human behavior and 
budgeting (Argyris, 1952, 1953; Caplan, 1966; Hofstede, 1968; McGregor, 1960), as well as 
some BB literature from both academia (Ekholm & Wallin, 2000; Hope & Fraser, 2003; Libby 
& Lindsay, 2010) and practice (Bogsnes, 2009, 2013; Wallander, 1995, 1999). 
Since Argyris’ (1952, 1953) seminal work on budgets in the 1950s, a vast literature of 
behavioral budgeting research has emerged. Argyris (1953, p. 97) defined budgets as 
“accounting techniques designed to control costs through people”, and further pointed to the 
use of budgets for rewarding and penalizing purposes as a human and organizational issue. 




control, and others define the budget as a “device for planning and control” (e.g., Pettersen, 
1995, p. 207). 
It has been established that budgets have behavioral consequences for human action 
(see Argyris, 1953; Caplan, 1966), and “[t]he effective use of budgets and other accounting 
control techniques requires an understanding of the interaction between these techniques and 
the motivations and aspiration levels of the individuals to be controlled” (Caplan, 1966, p. 498). 
Birnberg and Shields (1989) showed how the study of budgeting practice became one of the 
earliest and most important ways to conduct behavioral accounting research. According to 
Horngren (1995), management accounting systems should provide information that supports 
economic decision-making, as well as motivating users toward organizational goals. Otley 
(1990) concludes that budgetary control has to be examined in a wider context. 
Covaleski et al. (2003) argue that budgeting includes both a set of numbers (the budget) 
and the process of developing and using budgets (the budgeting process) which involves human 
and organizational action, reaction, and interaction (on many levels). Franco-Santos and Otley 
(2018) equate management control systems (MCS) with performance management systems 
(PMS), acknowledging that earlier MCS work under-emphasized wider organizational control 
mechanisms. 
Accordingly, PMS may in some cases be a slightly wider term than MCS, but this paper 
uses the term PMS as an umbrella term encompassing budgeting (as a process), management 
control, and wider organizational control mechanisms and processes. The reason for doing so 
is that the current review focuses on the behavioral aspects of budgeting research in a wide 
sense, and includes tools and philosophies emerging as complementary or substitutive to more 
traditional budgeting practices. 
Having established a wide behavioral base for performance management research, 




budgeting (TB) research and Beyond Budgeting (BB) research to unearth similarities and 
differences that may improve theorization in BB research. 
3.1.1. Critique of Budgets 
Departing from the previously introduced budget criticism, the eclectic review identifies 
common themes with regards to problematic issues with budgeting and proposed solutions to 
such issues, as well as changes to PMS under these circumstances. 
The sum of criticisms towards the annual budget (mainly from practitioners) is that it 
“seems to fall short in its ability to aid in value creation based on superior external 
effectiveness” (Ekholm & Wallin, 2000, p. 523). Budget shortcomings have been approached 
in different ways in practice, where one approach is concerned with planning problems and the 
other is concerned with performance evaluation problems (Hansen et al., 2003). The practice 
literature on BB (e.g., Bogsnes, 2009; Hope & Fraser, 2003; Wallander, 1995, 1999) often takes 
a strong oppositional position, advocating budget abandonment. Wallander (1995, 1999) calls 
budgets an “unnecessary evil” and argues that the best one can do “is to heave your budgeting 
department and all their forms overboard” (Wallander, 1999, p. 411). Academic literature 
shows that despite widespread critique of budgets, budgets are still important for most 
businesses (Libby & Lindsay, 2010). 
Hansen et al. (2003) build on a report by Neely et al. (2001) and list several weaknesses 
with budgetary control. A recent literature review on BB (Nguyen et al., 2018), identifies a 
number of criticisms of TB, as well as changes to MCSs under BB. Franco-Santos and Otley 
(2018) study unintended consequences of PMSs, which largely overlap with weaknesses of, 
and criticisms towards, budgeting. TB is argued to be costly and time-consuming (Hansen et 
al., 2003; Nguyen et al., 2018), resulting in low value-creation (Ekholm & Wallin, 2000; 




slowly and updated too infrequently (Hansen et al., 2003), which practitioners argue creates an 
irrational focus on year-end evaluations and serves as an annual performance trap (Bogsnes, 
2009). Budgets are also criticized for being based upon guesswork and unsupported 
assumptions (Hansen et al., 2003). Further, one of the most prevalent criticisms towards TB is 
that budgeting encourages gaming and perverse behaviors (Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018; 
Hansen et al., 2003; Nguyen et al., 2018). Comparable to gaming are the problems of building 
slack through information manipulation and strategic misrepresentation (Franco-Santos & 
Otley, 2018), where individuals intentionally change or misrepresent financial or other 
performance data. 
TB is also criticized for focusing too much on cost reduction over value creation 
(Hansen et al., 2003), and this may lead to short-term thinking and myopic behavior (Van der 
Stede, 2000). Myopia leads to selective attention (Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018), and focusing 
on a narrow set of budgetary targets may result in an illusion of control and work against a 
wider strategic perspective in the organization (Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018; Hansen et al., 
2003; Nguyen et al., 2018). In terms of flexibility, TB is considered to constrain the 
responsiveness of the organization (Hansen et al., 2003), result in low adaptability in dynamic 
business environments (Nguyen et al., 2018), and generally, hamper change within the 
organization, as well as not reflecting the emerging network structures that contemporary 
organizations are adopting (Hansen et al., 2003). 
Finally, the literature shows that budgets are considered to strengthen vertical 
command-and-control (Hansen et al., 2003; Nguyen et al., 2018), resulting in strict hierarchies 
that reinforce departmental barriers rather than encourage knowledge sharing and learning 
(Hansen et al., 2003). Correspondingly, Franco-Santos and Otley (2018) discuss altered social 
relationships as a consequence of introducing new PMSs. These alterations of social structures 




3.1.2. Proposed Solutions and Consequences for PMS 
When discussing the emerging criticism towards traditional budgeting, the literature identifies 
a set of changes to the organizations, their members, and the PMS in place. Performance 
measures, linked to motivation and reward, are proposed to be set as relative stretch targets 
instead of as absolute targets (Hansen et al., 2003; Nguyen et al., 2018). A high level of 
individual participation is assumed to be positively correlated with good performance (Nguyen 
et al., 2018), and resource allocation is proposed to be dynamic, ongoing, and readily available 
on a case-by-case basis (Hansen et al., 2003; Nguyen et al., 2018). 
Covaleski et al. (2003) consider the term participation used in TB literature as an 
analogous term to the contemporary focus on employee empowerment. In terms of planning 
and forecasting, BB advocates a more frequent updating of numbers through e.g., rolling 
forecasts, as well as a strategic and value-creating focus (Nguyen et al., 2018). Under BB, the 
controller is argued to become more strategy-focused, and decentralization and employee 
empowerment improve organizational agility and flexibility (Nguyen et al., 2018). BB is argued 
to lower focus on rigid planning and control, and instead involve “more anticipation, 
monitoring, and empowerment” (Ekholm & Wallin, 2000, p. 521). This in itself appears 
contradictory and paradoxical, as increased monitoring intuitively undermines the authenticity 
of empowerment, and thus warrants further inquiry into the idiosyncrasies of budgeting 
research. 
Just like other studies of the performance management literature (Covaleski et al., 2003; 
Ekholm & Wallin, 2000; Hansen et al., 2003; Nguyen et al., 2018) points to altered social 
relationships, hierarchies, organization, and culture as changing under BB, Argyris (1953) 
understood that the logics behind budgets (as a numeral representation of an organization) were 
flawed, and that “[a]n organization is something different from the sum of the individual parts” 




Organizations are not cumulative, in the sense that one may not simply add all of the 
broken-down parts into a complete picture. Rather, it is the relationships between parts of an 
organization (and hence processes) that make a difference. Financial staff and managers that 
continuously work to improve their understanding of themselves and others in an organization 
are argued to be more effective and constructive in the long run (Argyris, 1953). Further, 
Hofstede (1968) identified participation and gaming as important related concepts for the 
success/failure of budget processes, concepts that are still central to budgeting and PMS 
research today. Argyris (1953) highlights the benefits of participation in budget processes, but 
he also provides evidence of pseudo-participation, in which participants only feel as if they had 
a say in the matter, and this pseudo-participation serves as a legitimating process where 
participants cannot retrospectively complain about the budget outcome. Hofstede (1968) 
emphasizes that gaming behavior may also have a positive side, in the way that a focus on 
budget attainment may create a spirit of sportsmanship (similar to the current arguments for 
internal benchmarks and league tables). 
The contemporary practitioner in BB literature (e.g., Bogsnes, 2009, 2013) claims to 
have a fundamentally different view on human beings by drawing on McGregor’s (1960) 
Theory X vs. Theory Y, yet this focus on the human side is clearly not novel. In a response to 
a book review, Hofstede (1970, p. 136) refuses to accept that his work on budget control was 
“Theory Y inspired” with an agenda for participation in and of itself. He argues that 
participation is not necessarily good in itself, and shows that external reference points, as well 
as decisions from higher up the hierarchy, codetermine the impact of a budget control system. 
The relationship between control and autonomy is a complicated one, and as old as 
“organized human group life” (Hofstede, 1968, p. 12). In some cases, there may be an aligned 
desire for control between a superior and a subordinate, and if so, the total amount of 




is no obvious direct relationship between organizational performance and individual autonomy 
(Hofstede, 1968). In conclusion, both structure (hierarchy) and autonomy (participation) play 
an important role in budgeting success, and they are not always opposites on a zero-sum 
spectrum. 
3.1.3. Scoping the Structured Literature Review 
As previously mentioned, this eclectic review forms the basis from which the structured 
literature review departs. Drawing on the above review, I synthesize common themes, research 
thrusts, and clusters into an aggregated categorization of budgeting research for further 
analyses. 
First, separating TB from BB will mainly be based on whether a research paper itself or 
an ensuing review paper, identifies the research as BB research. Second, research themes and 
concepts are separated on a dimension of whether the research presents a problem with 
budgeting or proposes a solution. The term solution must not be misinterpreted as a definitive, 
final solution, but the research theme distinguishes itself by proposing some change in the 
budgeting process, human relationships, or organizational structure. 
Finally, the review focuses on research within categories of behavioral or coordination 
issues. Behavioral problems are often met with behavioral solutions, and coordination 
problems are habitually solved through organizational/structural solutions. Considering most 
papers deal with problems and solutions on both the behavioral and the coordination spectrum, 
the typology is not distinct, and research is categorized based on where it fits best. 
In summary, the clusters in Figure 1 below represent two wide sets of problems and two 
wide sets of proposed solutions as presented in the preceding eclectic review. There are 
behavioral problems, represented by concepts such as gaming behavior, information 




solved through, for example, participation in the budgeting process (i.e., behavioral solutions). 
Then there are coordination problems related, for example, to planning, forecasting, an illusion 
of control, and resource allocation, with organizational solutions such as bureaucracy, 
hierarchy, strategic alignment, and organizational flexibility. 
 
Figure 1. Problems and solutions on two dimensions. 
Based on the findings in the eclectic review, I would argue that BB benefits from looking to 
TB literature to build knowledge on how to design efficient and effective PMSs. For instance, 
the argument that budgets are poorly adapted to complex business environments is not 
something BB literature is alone in addressing. One recent example is Kaufman and Covaleski 
(2019) who study budget flexibility (TB) in terms of formality and informality as a tool to 
successfully manage institutional complexity and competing institutional logics over time. 
Similarly, Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) found that reasons-to-budget differ, which requires 
organizations to make tradeoffs between different budget uses, contingent upon situational 
circumstances. 
As Anthony (1989) concluded 30 years ago, the basic structure of management 
accounting may not change (nor did he consider it likely to change), yet there is room for 
improvement in how we go about solving issues of information technology, measurement, 




management) may never be eliminated, as new tools, methods and philosophies introduce new 
sets of unintended consequences. 
Nevertheless, as organizations continue to make new attempts at improving efficiency 
and simultaneously maintaining a level of control, management accountants will have to be 
ambidextrous and flexible, as they move forward in the nexus between autonomy, flexibility, 
and creativity on the one hand and structure and control on the other. This realization, however, 
is not novel in any way, as Hofstede (1968) showed half a century ago when he discussed the 
conflict between control and autonomy, as well as the democratization of business, politics, 
family, and religion. The succeeding structured literature review mobilizes the framework 
presented at the end of the eclectic review and identifies and analyzes similarities and 
differences between TB and BB, as well as providing direction for future research on budgeting. 
3.2. Systematic Literature Review 
The objective of this systematic literature review is to provide an extensive overview of issues 
in budgeting research, inherent problems, and proposed solutions to deal with these issues, both 
within TB and BB. The systematic review is based on the categorization that was developed in 
the preceding eclectic review. As pointed out in the previous chapter, these categories are not 
distinct. For instance, for motivation and rewards, there was a need to separate motivation as a 
behavioral problem from reward systems as an organizational solution, yet the combination of 
the two is present in behavioral solutions via participation, for example, in target setting. For a 
complete overview of the papers included in the systematic review, see Appendix B. 
3.2.1. Behavioral Problems 
In traditional budgeting research, the unwanted behavioral consequences of budgeting are well 




Argyris, 1953; Caplan, 1966; Hofstede, 1968) acknowledged the behavioral problems with 
budgeting early on, and the search for explaining anecdotal accounts of misrepresentation, 
slack, gaming, and myopic behavior led researchers to “simplify away” the complexities of 
managerial work and performance evaluation (Covaleski et al., 2003; Hopwood, 1972). The 
following section unearths some of the behavioral issues raised with budgeting, both in TB and 
in BB literature. 
Misrepresentation and slack building 
Several BB research articles (Hansen et al., 2003; Libby & Lindsay, 2010; Sandalgaard & 
Bukh, 2014) show how dysfunctional behavior (such as misrepresentation) may arise when 
holding managers accountable towards static budgetary targets with no credible (outside) 
reference point. The systematic literature review identified that these concerns are far from 
unique to BB, and budgeting researchers have already identified several situations in which 
these issues are acknowledged and attempted tackled. 
The basic mechanism of misrepresentation and the building of slack is quite intuitive. 
Given the opportunity to manipulate information due to information asymmetry, workers have 
an incentive to create slack by overstating task difficulty or resource requirements (Onsi, 1973; 
Waller, 1988). Slack creates biases in budgets and may result in weakened profitability through, 
for instance, expensive planning errors (Fisher, Maines, et al., 2002). 
Hayes and Cron (1988) study zero-base budgeting (ZBB), and how configurations of 
this particular budgeting system may affect behavior in budgeting endeavors. ZBB is argued to 
increase task uncertainty as one does not rely on previous experience, which in turn incentivizes 
dysfunctional behavior, such as misrepresentation of financial data which leads to information 




participation as a means of accessing private information might provide an opportunity for 
subordinates to manipulate the process in their favor and rather create slack. 
Chow et al. (1991) discuss how private information may motivate workers to create 
slack by manipulating or misrepresenting (understating) their true performance expectations, 
instead of maximizing performance. This is especially true when worker compensation is tied 
to performance standards or targets (Chow et al., 1991). Other studies of slack nuance the 
picture by providing detailed evidence for a bidirectional relationship between slack creation, 
organizational commitment, and job involvement. Highly committed managers are less likely 
to build budgetary slack when participating in budget processes, whereas managers with low 
organizational commitment are more likely to build slack (Nouri, 1994). 
Gaming and Myopic Behavior 
As the earliest article in this sample advocating for new and advanced management systems, 
Bunce, Fraser and Woodcock’s (1995) work is classified as a BB-paper, even though the term 
is not explicitly used by the authors. The paper argues that traditional budgeting leads to a lack 
of commitment, dysfunctional behavior, and wasted opportunities due to bureaucratic processes 
with low value-add. 
Hansen, Otley and Van der Stede (2003) adapt a practitioner article on problems with 
budgets and show how vertical command-and-control makes people feel undervalued, and how 
TB impedes employee empowerment. Another issue with budgeting that BB criticizes is 
gaming and myopic behavior, which is closely linked to the previous section on slack and 
misrepresentation. 
Østergren and Stensaker (2011) point to how TB may encourage myopic decision-
making and dysfunctional budget gaming. The decoupling of strategy from operations, as well 




biased towards short-term target attainment over long-term performance considerations 
(Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013; Østergren & Stensaker, 2011). 
In TB, pressure towards meeting the budget is recognized as a factor that may inspire 
gaming behavior, yet Lyne (1988) finds no dysfunctional consequences from budget pressures. 
In fact, in his study, pressures to meet targets is found to come from the individual, not senior 
management or accounting personnel (Lyne, 1988). In a later study, Lyne (1992) reaffirmed 
that internal budget pressure is the main source of budget pressure and that this pressure was 
considered beneficial, even by lower-level managers. 
Arnold (2015) points to how TB and negotiation are criticized for being time-consuming 
and generating high financial pressure to meet targets set by top management which inspires 
gaming behavior. Lal, Dunk and Smith (1996) support the notion that budgetary pressure (the 
importance of meeting budgets) and access to private information influence the propensity to 
create slack. They further propose that investments in information systems and initiatives to 
understand the effects of task uncertainty may improve slack controllability (Lal et al., 1996). 
Tight budgetary targets are associated with slack creation for both manufacturing 
operations and marketing departments, but only in manufacturing will cost control reduce the 
propensity to create slack (Lau, 1999). This suggests that control system effectiveness differs 
between intra-organizational functions. In addition to creating slack, tight budgetary control is 
also related to a strong emphasis on meeting short-term targets (Van der Stede, 2001). 
With regards to gaming as unwanted behavior, Christiansen and Skærbæk (1997) show 
how budget games may indeed increase communication, and how in these games, different 
actors fix attention to different areas. Games and sub-games may emerge in different settings 
and influence organizational power distributions. Uddin and Hopper (2001) observe gaming as 
a functional concept for local management, as this may work to relieve the pressures of work 




Fisher, Frederickson and Peffer (2000), budgeting research has separated the planning aspect 
of budgets (slack) from the motivational aspects (subordinate performance) and argue that there 
might be trade-offs between these aspects worth exploring where negotiation participation is 
part of the budgeting process. Negotiation and participation as a solution to dealing with 
budgeting problems follow in the next section. 
Other Behavioral Issues 
A very different behavioral insight shows how budgeting practice, by reducing political 
uncertainty and complexity to resource allocation problems, converted “the unthinkable” (i.e., 
nuclear war preparation) to technical and mundane tasks (Chwastiak, 2001). The simplification 
of complexity to numbers through budgeting may ease the emotional burden of morally difficult 
decision-making (Chwastiak, 2001), and works to desensitize individuals towards being 
accountable for something without having to take personal responsibility for the decision. 
In this sense, accounting reduces role conflict as the system legitimizes decisions by 
converting morally difficult questions to technicalities. On the subject of role conflict, in a study 
of mid-level managers, Marginson and Bui (2009, p. 59) show how the expectancy of 
“innovation and empowerment alongside budget-goal attainment may increase levels of 
psychological role conflict, leading to a decrease in performance”. They find that a dualistic 
role expectancy may have positive outcomes for high-performing managers, but is detrimental 
to low-performing managers (Marginson & Bui, 2009). 
Summing up Behavioral Problems 
Both BB and TB are concerned with budgeting problems and unwanted/unintended 
consequences of budget processes, and the review shows that the apprehensions in both 




build upon previous knowledge to advance research on performance management. 
3.2.2. Behavioral Solutions 
Researchers have offered several potential solutions to a diverse set of problems and unintended 
consequences of budgeting. In this section, I elaborate on participation, target setting, and 
stretch, respectively. 
Participation 
In traditional budgeting research, participation is presented as a concept that may reduce 
budgetary slack in organizations (Onsi, 1973). Mia (1988) finds that participation in budgeting 
is contingent upon the participants’ attitude and motivation. A favorably motivated manager is 
associated with improved performance, whereas a demotivated manager is associated with 
impaired performance. 
Nouri (1994) showed how job involvement (i.e., participation) is negatively correlated 
with slack creation for managers with high organizational commitment, whereas for managers 
with low organizational commitment, job involvement is positively correlated with slack 
creation. This illustrates under which circumstances participation may reduce slack, and that 
participation itself is likely not enough to deal with slack creation. Even though participation is 
not necessarily unequivocally positive for performance, participation in budget processes may, 
however, reduce budget criticism and resistance towards budgetary goals and targets. When 
participation, managerial involvement, and the importance assigned to action plans during 
budget negotiations are high, budgets are less criticized (Sponem & Lambert, 2016). 
To deal with the issue of slack, Waller (1988) demonstrates that the introduction of a 
truth-inducing incentive scheme decreases slack for risk-neutral subjects but not for risk-averse 




uncertainty in goal attainment. Chow et al. (1991) show how self-set standards (i.e., 
participation) under a truth-inducing incentive scheme reduces inserted slack, but that a ratchet 
(a minimum standard based on past performance) is just as effective in slack reduction when 
information about past performance becomes available. Hence, there may only be a short-term 
effect of participation, and this insight may also explain some of the problems with ZBB 
(Anthony, 1989; Hayes & Cron, 1988) which discards knowledge about past performance and 
starts anew every year. Thus, some of the TB literature indicates that participation will only be 
valuable in uncertain environments with risk-neutral subjects. 
In his studies, Peter Brownell (1981, 1982) shows how the effect of budget participation 
on performance is moderated by the individuals’ locus of control. Participation has a positive 
effect on performance when individuals feel they have a large degree of control over their 
destiny, whereas the opposite is true for individuals who feel that the outcome of their destiny 
comes down to luck, chance, or fate. Thus, “[i]nternals (individuals who feel that they are in 
control of their destinies) appear more job-satisfied and perform better under conditions of high 
participation” (Brownell, 1982, p. 766). 
By contrast, “externals (individuals who attribute the results of their actions to chance, 
luck, or fate) are more job-satisfied and perform better under conditions of low participation.” 
(Brownell, 1982, p. 766). It may seem intuitive that participation is desirable when an individual 
is in control of outcomes. BB promotes participation through decentralized decision-making 
and employee empowerment (Nguyen et al., 2018). BB is often argued to be particularly helpful 
in complex, dynamic, and rapid-changing business environments, which, according to 
Brownell’s (1982) findings, indicate that participation is not particularly appropriate. However, 
Brownell’s (1982) findings apply to the individual’s attribution of controllability, which may 
indicate that the successful adoption of BB principles requires a deeper mindset change 




Brownell and McInnes (1986) interestingly show that even though participation and 
performance are significantly positively related, it is not mediated by motivation as previously 
hypothesized. Participation’s relationship with motivation is found to be insignificant 
(Brownell & McInnes, 1986). In a meta-review of budget participation and reliance on 
accounting performance measures (RAPM), Derfuss (2009, p. 224) concludes that “budgetary 
participation creates value through its positive association with managers’ attitudes and 
behavior”, but that the value is difficult to measure. This insight may be of great value for BB 
researchers going forward and may inspire research on successful BB implementation and the 
role of motivation, locus of control, and mindset changes. 
In BB, budget negotiations are considered to be biased by conflicting purposes of the 
budget. Separating the planning/forecasting from resource allocation and performance 
evaluation is thought to mitigate the gaming for low targets that increase the probability of goal 
attainment and financial rewards (Henttu-Aho & Järvinen, 2013; Østergren & Stensaker, 2011). 
However, when exploring the use of negotiated budgets for both planning and 
performance evaluation, Arnold and Gillenkirch (2015) find that the subordinate’s budget 
proposals and performance increase subordinate cooperation and that the increase is larger than 
the loss of flexibility for the superior using only one budget. Fisher et al. (2000) find that 
negotiated budgets ending in agreement contain significantly less slack than unilaterally 
decided budgets. 
Inviting subordinates to participate (negotiate) is however not without risk as a “failed 
negotiation followed by superiors imposing a budget has a significant detrimental effect on 
subordinate performance” (Fisher et al., 2000, p. 94). In a later study, subordinates’ under-
performance due to unilateral budgeting decisions is linked to fairness considerations and 
demotivation (Fisher, Frederickson, et al., 2002). Arnold (2015) shows how exogenous 




meet targets) induce cooperation. “[I]n constrained situations, firms seem to adopt particularly 
efficient internal coordination processes” (Arnold, 2015, p. 32). 
Interestingly, Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe (2013) find that the unbundling of budget 
purposes requires negotiation, which is one of the problems with budgets BB set out to solve. 
This gives nuance to the somewhat dogmatic claim in BB that separating budget purposes is 
necessary to improve performance and agility, and it shows how the separation of budget 
purposes in BB does not eliminate negotiation and gaming. 
Davila and Wouters (2005) provide empirical evidence on purposefully budgeted slack 
with the motivating intention to facilitate managerial work. The company accepted more slack 
as goals other than budget targets became harder to achieve. By explicitly allowing slack, 
headquarters signaled to local managers that other measures (such as service and product 
quality) were at least as important as budget targets (Davila & Wouters, 2005), and strengthens 
the argument that it is the use of budgets that may or may not be detrimental to performance. 
Searfoss (1976) discusses both participation, reward structures, and budget target 
attainability as important variables in individuals’ motivation to achieve the budget. Perceived 
participation in the budgeting process is found to be most important for “goal-directing effort, 
whereas perceived reward-dependency had the most significant relationship with the evaluative 
effort” (Searfoss, 1976, p. 375). Target attainability seemed less important for motivation than 
participation and reward-dependency, and Searfoss (1976) discusses how the budget becomes 
the goal itself. Merchant and Riccaboni (1990) find that financial rewards in their case company 
are based on short-term performance measures, that actual performance is evaluated against 
highly achievable budget targets, and that few adjustments are made for uncontrollable factors. 
Thus, meeting the budget becomes a measure of organizational success, requiring budgets to 





Shields and Shields (1998) find that participative budgeting is particularly important for 
planning and control, specifically by improving vertical information sharing (extracting private 
information) and through the coordination of interdependence. Dunk (1990) shows how 
participation may improve managers’ access to private information and reduce information 
asymmetry, but at the same time subordinates are given an opportunity to manipulate the 
budgeting process and create slack. Another study finds that formal budget participation serves 
as a ritual of control and legitimation, without actually including middle managers (Fernandez-
Revuelta Perez & Robson, 1999). 
The lack of substantive involvement is argued to serve as an introduction of de-coupling 
and organizational hypocrisy to budget participation (Brunsson, 1993; Fernandez-Revuelta 
Perez & Robson, 1999). This implies that organizations should be thoughtful about when and 
how to include personnel in decision processes. Libby (1999) shows how performance increases 
when a combination of voice (the subordinate’s involvement in the budgeting process) and 
explanation (the communication of a rationale for the subordinate’s lack of influence over 
unilaterally set budget targets) is mobilized. With this in mind, it may actually be 
communication, and not participation (for participation’s sake), that is driving performance. 
Target Setting and Stretch 
Tiller (1983) provides evidence for increased commitment and performance from participants 
who perceived themselves as having agency over the decision to set difficult-to-achieve 
budgets, even in the absence of a performance-contingent reward structure. In a later study, Mia 
(1989) provides further evidence for a positive relationship between participation and 
performance when perceived job difficulty was high. Lyne (1992) shows how it is accountants 
that are most keen on increased participation in budget processes, as opposed to managers and 




accountants (controllers) are becoming more powerful in BB organizations as they are at the 
center of multi-level communication (Henttu-Aho & Järvinen, 2013; Østergren & Stensaker, 
2011). 
Østergren and Stensaker (2011) found that under BB, targets are expected to contain 
stretch (be ambitious/difficult) and become more strategic. By separating target setting from 
planning and resource allocation, it enables a more ambitious approach towards target setting 
because it is not so explicitly linked to costs as it is under TB. Whether BB helps in empowering 
people to creatively secure their projects, or just start new projects, remains to be discovered 
(Østergren & Stensaker, 2011). 
Hirst and Yetton (1999) found that goal setting and task interdependence affect 
performance variance, suggesting that goal difficulty may be contingent upon whether budgets 
are used for coordination or motivation. Budget goals are claimed to increase performance, and 
specific, difficult goals generate higher performance than specific, moderate goals (Hirst & 
Yetton, 1999), which is in line with the argumentation of BB rhetoric. Stretch targets seem to 
be useful for low complexity tasks as performance variance is initially low, whereas achievable 
targets are likely to reduce costly budget variance in high complexity tasks (Hirst & Yetton, 
1999). 
Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe (2013) identify how decision-makers need to change their 
mindset from the safe and familiar (comfort zone) to the ambitious unknown (stretch zone). 
Under BB, decision-makers are forced to rethink what managerial information they both supply 
and request when the PMS design changes. Previous research on task complexity and the 
benefit of stretch may provide insightful input to BB research on the subject. 
In BB, benchmarking and setting relative performance targets is argued to “increase the 
accuracy and perceived fairness of performance evaluations, thereby reducing gaming 




competition for resources are assumed to improve efficiency in BB, yet Brüggen and Luft 
(2011) found that the intensity of internal resource competition affects misrepresentation and 
that medium competition is the worst setting for voluntary information sharing. Derfuss (2016) 
finds that relative ratings may help control for confounding influences and that from a 
theoretical standpoint they are preferable over absolute ratings. Insights from Brüggen and Luft 
(2011) may inform BB about settings in which relative performance evaluation is beneficial 
and when it might be harmful. Also, Aranda et al. (2019) show how this accuracy may be further 
improved through skillful managerial discretion over subjective bonuses. They find that 
managers are able to subjectively introduce stretch (relative to peers) to elicit larger 
performance increases (relative to peers). 
The introduction of hindsight in performance evaluation as a subjective adjustment of 
actual economic and operational circumstances is central to the BB approach, and it is used to 
promote collective over individual performance evaluation and remuneration (Hansen et al., 
2003). Regarding hindsight, TB offers little knowledge on the subject, and many organizations 
shy away from adjusting for uncontrollable factors (Merchant & Riccaboni, 1990). It may be 
of great interest to further explore the consequences of hindsight considerations for 
contemporary PMS researchers. When it comes to collective performance evaluation and target 
setting, Daroca (1984, p. 29) problematizes the practice of setting collective targets, as goals 
“established by a group may not be cognitively accepted by individuals”, which is also an 
avenue for further research. 
Summing up Behavioral Solutions 
Participation is the most dominant concept concerning the undertaking of budget shortcomings. 
The overall relationship between participation and performance is positive (Derfuss, 2016), but 




ample opportunity for manipulation of information and building slack. Relative stretch targets 
with hindsight is an area in BB that offers interesting opportunities for future research and 
potentially complimentary knowledge to an already existing literature on relative performance 
measurement. 
3.2.3. Coordination Problems 
Advanced management systems require changes in systems and culture (Bunce et al., 1995), 
with a focus on business process orientation and integrating different management functions 
and initiatives. In the BB approach, organizational structures of accountability should enable 
the empowerment of individuals in terms of access to resources (Ekholm & Wallin, 2000; 
Hansen et al., 2003). 
In reality, BB advocates radically decentralized organizations and reliance on 
administrative, cultural and clan controls instead of strict resource input controls to replace TB 
(Becker, 2014; Hansen et al., 2003; O’Grady & Akroyd, 2016). Rolling forecasts with frequent 
updates deal with some of the uncertainties from quickly changing business environments, and 
by using e.g., balanced scorecards, organizations may direct attention towards key business 
drivers that are aligned with strategy (Ekholm & Wallin, 2000). Some authors point to how the 
unbundling of budgetary purposes (i.e., target setting, forecasting, and resource allocation) 
shifts the organizational focus towards the future as well as aligning with strategy (Bourmistrov 
& Kaarbøe, 2013). 
Budgets are used for many purposes, and several coordination issues arise when budgets 
are used for planning activities, allocating resources, performance evaluation, motivating 
employees, compensation, and much more (Covaleski et al., 2003). Bunce et al. (1995) criticize 




emphasis on financial perspectives and costs. Strategies are changing as reactions to 
competitive and structural pressures. 
In terms of coordination, the time spent developing budgets results in budgets being 
outdated by the time they are used (Ekholm & Wallin, 2000). Hansen (2011) discusses how 
different organizations in different circumstances will have different perceptions of what 
constitutes a good budgeting process and design. Budgets may impede organizational resource 
allocation, and the vertical command-and-control structure is incompatible with flat 
organizational designs and empowered employees (Østergren & Stensaker, 2011). 
As organizational dynamics are argued to increase, budgets are claimed to fail in 
providing decision-relevant information to individual decision-makers. Libby and Lindsay 
(2010) point to how BB as a practice-developed concept is built on the assumption that budgets 
are fundamentally flawed and should be eliminated. However, they still find that most 
organizations continue to use budgets for controlling and that budgets are perceived to be value-
adding. 
Even though problems with budgets are acknowledged, organizations are adapting their 
use rather than abandoning them altogether (Libby & Lindsay, 2010). Derfuss (2016) shows 
that the overall relationship between budget participation and performance is positive and 
significant, and has previously concluded that the emphasis on budgets for performance 
evaluation does not automatically lead to adverse consequences (Derfuss, 2009). Further, TB 
is criticized for being too narrowly focused on incremental changes to budget allocations of 
existing activities. Through alternative approaches such as ZBB, organizations are being forced 
to critically review all activities (as all activities are reset to zero) before making any resource 
allocation decisions (Hayes & Cron, 1988). However, according to Anthony (1989, p. 14), 




One of the earliest papers reviewed in this sample (Searfoss, 1976), points to the goal-
directing effort and evaluative effort as two dimensions of a manager’s efforts in a budget 
process. In the 1970s, novel organizational forms were argued to change management 
philosophies, which led to organizations adopting new concepts and techniques. Budgets were 
considered one of the most important organizational control systems, and these new 
developments required design changes in many management information systems to make the 
overall control system more effective (Ansari, 1979). 
This is comparable to the contemporary thrust in BB, where practitioners, in particular, 
argue that BB is a management philosophy and not a specific tool. Schiff and Lewin (1970) 
discuss how budgets serve different, and sometimes conflicting purposes, as they are both 
projections for the future (i.e., forecasts), plans for the coming year, and the basis of the control 
system. However, even though they are both plans and performance evaluation criteria, budgets 
are generally perceived as control devices, more than planning. In another study, it is found that 
most companies saw budgets as mainly forecasts, yet all companies had a significant minority 
of actors that perceived a target element in budget processes (Lyne, 1988). It is the use of 
budgets as control devices that resulted in criticism of the budgets as coercive instruments 
(Schiff & Lewin, 1970). These criticisms from Schiff and Lewin (1970) about conflicting 
purposes and strict control overlap with the budget criticisms central to contemporary BB 
literature. 
Budgets are considered to be rigid, to stifle initiative and centralize decision-making 
(Hansen et al., 2003). Further, budgets are considered to work as fixed performance contracts, 
and increased environmental uncertainty is incompatible with such rigidity (Sandalgaard & 
Bukh, 2014). Arnold and Gillenkirch (2015) explored the issue of using a single budget for 
conflicting purposes and found that even though conflicting purposes involve a loss of 




organizations start the year with a single budget but end the year with separate budget levels, 
indicating that budget levels are revised during the year. 
Other authors discuss how forecasts (or futurology) are “projections intended to 
influence the future” (Charnes et al., 1976, p. 315), and acknowledge the performative role of 
projections as they influence the future. The use of budgets to increase organizational learning 
may be a different avenue. Through a historical approach, Chandar and Miranti (2009) studied 
how AT&T made long-term efforts in organizational learning to improve forecasting of future 
telecommunication services demand. 
Jablonsky and Dirsmith (1978) show how a particular management accounting 
innovation (PBB) meant to improve both planning and control (coordination) failed due to 
complexity and lack of understanding in the organization. Even though PBB was considered to 
fail, it did not always fail, and Jablonsky and Dirsmith (1978) point to top management support, 
actual adaptation, and usage, as well as capability to cope with organizational changes as some 
of the important factors for less unsuccessful implementation. 
When studying accounting initiatives to deal with budgeting problems in the public 
sector, Gordon and Sellers (1984) conduct an empirical study of ZBB and find that “[d]uring 
periods of resource scarcity there was an increased demand for out-of-phase accounting 
feedback on the budget” (Gordon & Sellers, 1984, p. 283). Becker et al. (2016) find that in an 
economic crisis, budgeting became less important for performance evaluation and more 
important for planning and resource allocation. This supports the argument that the annual 
nature of budgets may be suboptimal, particularly in times of scarce resources, and shows how 
the perceived usefulness of different budgeting approaches may depend on resource availability 
(Becker et al., 2016; Gordon & Sellers, 1984). The question of whether BB is particularly useful 
in already successful organizations and less so for struggling organizations is an interesting 




In terms of controllability, Hoque and Hopper (1994) found that budgeting was not a 
dominant mode of control in their case organization, but served as a legitimating device towards 
the head office and external stakeholders, thus providing merely illusory control. Uddin and 
Hopper (2001) show how detailed accounting systems may become ritualistic, marginal, and 
decoupled from operations, and the use of budgets is mainly as a pressure device for coercing 
action with subordinates. 
Helliar, Cobb and Innes (2002) find that even though management accounting 
techniques, as well as the organizational discourse, are changing towards long-term planning 
and control, short-term accounting solutions and managerial reactions to new external 
development are still the norm. These studies show how the awareness of, and shift towards, 
different accounting techniques and control modes is difficult to implement due to change 
resistance and myopic behavior. 
The conventional image of budgetary control as a response to problems with internal 
coordination is challenged by traditional budgeting researchers (Armstrong et al., 1996; Arya 
& Glover, 1996). A research paper published before BB became established finds that only “a 
minority of companies uses a wide range of profit and cost ratios whilst an equally large 
minority appears not to rely on budgetary control at all” (Armstrong et al., 1996, p. 1). 
3.2.4. Organizational Solutions 
Some researchers argue that through the decentralization of management structure and 
modifying budget-based control processes, organizations facing complex and changing 
environments can move beyond budgeting (O’Grady et al., 2017). O’Grady et al. (2017) further 
show how there may be different modes of BB (better budgeting, advanced budgeting, restricted 





Schiff and Lewin (1970, p. 260) argue that “real” organizations face complex tasks and 
objectives, and have to achieve these through the efforts of diverse participants. They seek to 
understand why people who differ in capabilities, aspirations, personalities, and perceptions 
join, and remain in, a particular organization. 
When studying budget variances, Ansari (1979) identifies several problems with ad hoc 
problem solving through budgets (such as data manipulation, blame-shifting, etc.). Instead, 
Ansari (1979) argues that shifting from control over people to control over system may improve 
cooperation and shift towards global problem solving over local problem solving which leads 
to competition between departments. 
Considering the complexity of “real” organizations, Otley (1999) discusses how 
different elements of organizational control are added to performance management systems and 
packages by different people at different times. This requires PMS to be studied in a wider 
context because PMS is not a rational set of control mechanisms that work perfectly for the 
purposes they were designed. The accounting/strategy link affects PMS design and use (Otley, 
1999), and even though the implementation of strategic priorities may not influence the 
importance of accounting, it is likely to influence the use of accounting tools (Abernethy & 
Brownell, 1999). 
Abernethy and Brownell (1999, p. 199) further show that “where top management use 
budgeting in an interactive mode, this better serves the needs for the learning and adaptation 
required when strategic change is underway”. Granlund and Malmi (2002) find that 
management accounting techniques, traditional as well as advanced, operate in separate 
systems. Integrated enterprise-wide systems may free up time from routine tasks and lead to 
more time left for valuable analysis. 
Merchant (1981) finds that formal administrative controls are relatively more used in 




firms evaluated formal and elaborate budgeting processes as desirable, but it appears that the 
link between good organizational performance and formal budgets is greater for larger firms 
(Merchant, 1981). 
In their study, Hoque and Hopper (1994) show how a variety of social and informal 
control mechanisms were employed to deal with complexity and uncertainty, sidelining the 
formal budget as a legitimating device. Cobb, Helliar and Innes (1995) find that management 
accounting change (in general) increases communication between managers and management 
accountants, and communication is previously found to reduce allocative distortions 
(Balakrishnan, 1992). This might indicate that it is change itself, not any given tool, technique, 
or philosophy that has the greatest organizational consequences. 
Linking participation to organizational structure, Gul, Tsui, Fong and Kwok (1995, p. 
107) find that “at high levels of decentralization there is a positive relationship between 
budgetary participation and managerial performance but at low levels of decentralization, this 
relationship is negative”. This shows how the design of organizational hierarchies and 
bureaucracies influences the efficacy of behavioral solutions, such as participation. Similarly, 
when Stammerjohan, Leach and Stammerjohan (2015) study budgetary participation in relation 
to power distance, they find that for lower power distance managers, job satisfaction is 
important for connecting budgetary participation and performance. However, for high power 
distance managers, the only moderating variable between budgetary participation and 
performance is job-relevant information. 
Fisher, Maines, et al. (2002) study the use of a single budget for both planning and 
performance evaluation and find that this provides incentives for subordinates to both increase 
effort and performance, as well as revealing private information. Single budget use may 
mitigate inefficiencies created by slack and capital rationing (cushioning/sandbagging). 




may reduce budget slack, but only when budgets are used for performance evaluation (Fisher, 
Maines, et al., 2002). 
Similar to the potentially beneficial consequences of exogenous constraints in budget 
negotiations, Friis and Hansen (2015) come to the conclusion that the constraints a line-item 
budget imposes on an individual (in their case a film director) may protect the individual from 
negative aspects of passion, such as distorted thought processes, myopia, and weakness of will. 
Use of budgetary reports is related to the managers’ freedom and flexibility in dealing 
with provided information (Armstrong et al., 1996). Mouritsen (1996) shows how accountants 
mobilize calculative techniques to mediate exchanges between different organizational actors, 
and that understanding of technique application develops through appreciation of how 
techniques relate to specific organizational settings. 
In a research paper on continuous budgeting, Frow et al. (2010) show how the 
integration of conflicting budget objectives with other management controls, managers were 
encouraged to use discretion in the face of complex and unexpected events. This flexibility 
enabled managers to prioritize and revise plans and resource allocation decisions to meet wider 
organizational objectives. The empowerment of managers came with an increase in 
accountability towards goal attainment, both for managers individually and for the organization 
as a whole (Frow et al., 2010). Charnes et al. (1976) also discuss how flexible budgets were 
used in business practice, as opposed to fixed budgets in the public sector, and how the flexible 
use of budgets may in fact increase managerial accountability. 
In a mathematical modeling of coordination problems, Arya and Glover (1996) model 
relative performance evaluation as a way to discover private information from subordinates. 
However, using relative performance measures resulted in a tacit collusion problem, where 
agents work together to set low targets and provide low effort. This is an unstable equilibrium 




other. The awareness of tacit collusion problems due to relative performance measures is 
something BB researchers could build on when exploring relative performance evaluation with 
hindsight. 
In a study of forecasting, Chen, Rennekamp and Zhou (2015) study the relevance of 
specific forecast design choices for forecast quality. They find that in the absence of 
performance-based incentives, disaggregated forecasts lead to better improvements in forecast 
accuracy. In the presence of performance-based incentives, disaggregated forecasts lead to 
greater forecast optimism, which is an unintentional bias in forecast quality. 
Hansen (2011) mathematically shows how there are no generic impacts of introducing 
different budgeting alternatives (i.e., rolling budgets, activity-based budgeting, and BB). 
Instead, his research highlights the importance of identifying how specific changes will affect 
a given organization, and what area is most important for a specific organization to improve. 
There are complex interaction effects and unintended consequences from implementation, and 
successful implementation is far from guaranteed (Hansen, 2011). Similar to one of the 
takeaways on participation research, BB itself does not solve anything, but solutions are 
context-dependent and require case-specific investigations of interactions and behavioral 
consequences. 
As one of the first empirical studies published about BB practice, Østergren and 
Stensaker (2011) show how the absence of budgets changes the relationship between corporate 
and division management, thus upsetting the existing lines of dependency between divisions. 
BB leads to structural and organizational changes, and, through decentralization, target 
attainment (how to reach targets) is democratized (Østergren & Stensaker, 2011). Through the 
dynamic resource allocation under BB, organizations may gain an increased focus on 
possibilities (rather than budget constraints), and this process provides more organizational 




One study found that separating “target setting from planning is critical to eroding the 
legitimacy of traditional budgeting” (Henttu-Aho & Järvinen, 2013, p. 783), indicating that an 
oppositional view is required to change the institutionalized practice of budgeting. If this 
separation is not achieved, remnants of the “old” system may still characterize the somewhat 
simplified version of traditional budgeting (Becker, 2014; Henttu-Aho & Järvinen, 2013). 
Becker (2014) illustrates how budget abandonment may be an exercise in the 
deinstitutionalization of traditional budgeting practices through skillful agency, but also how 
budgeting practices may re-institutionalize, albeit in a slightly different form if budget 
abandonment is unsuccessful. Another study shows that a head of finance experienced with BB 
is a major catalyst for change, but that this may not be enough unless the initiative is grounded 
in “an appropriate business purpose that is shared by other powerful agents in the organisation, 
including its chief officers and the board of directors” (Valuckas, 2019, p. 102). 
In her study of rolling forecasts and BB, Henttu-Aho (2016) shows how new budgetary 
practices enabled employees in controlling functions to develop new competencies. The 
organization needs to have enough flexibility in its bureaucracy to enable learning and improve 
organizational efficacy (Henttu-Aho, 2016). O’Grady, Akroyd and Scott (2017) suggest that 
organizations with different levels of environmental uncertainty may achieve sufficient 
adaptability with varying degrees of decentralization and changes to management structure, 
where non-budgeting is most suited to organizations facing very high levels of unpredictability. 
Balancing control and flexibility is the main objective in a BB organization studied by 
Sandalgaard and Bukh (2014), and the authors show how this balancing act results in the 
organization maintaining line-item budgets to explain performance variance and to track 
deviations from plan. It is argued that the structure of an organization may affect the 
appropriateness of relative performance evaluations, and that target setting is decoupled from 




to handle the uncertainty of dynamic environments and complex organizational coordination 
(Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013; Henttu-Aho & Järvinen, 2013; Sandalgaard & Bukh, 2014). 
4. Concluding Discussion 
This paper aimed to add to our understanding of how TB and BB can be integrated into a unified 
research thrust on the evolution of budgeting and PMS studies. In particular, I have highlighted 
some areas where budgeting research has grown apart. Starting with problems with budgeting, 
the following section will accentuate where the detached literatures diverge and converge and 
present some prolific avenues for further investigation. 
As BB research is considered to be fragmented, incoherent, and mostly about budget 
improvement initiatives (Nguyen et al., 2018), this review attempts to alleviate some of the 
concerns about an unconnected literature by establishing some common ground within the 
broader field. Specifically, I argue that in order to provide meaningful contributions, BB 
researchers must tear down the artificial divide between TB and BB. This current review, as 
well as Nguyen et al. (2018), reveals that both literatures are concerned with the behavioral 
consequences of management control. Thus, a more constructive alignment between research 
efforts is assumed to be beneficial. 
In the eclectic review, a general discussion about budget critique and attempts at 
rectifying budgeting flaws constitutes the scoping of the succeeding systematic review. The 
findings in the systematic review are related to behavioral issues, such as slack, budget gaming, 
myopia, etc., and proposed solutions, such as participation and stretch targets. Further, the 
systematic review categorizes and synthesizes literature on coordination problems and 
organizational solutions to such issues. 
As both the eclectic and systematic review identifies, the discussion of budget 




discussed to bring TB and BB closer together, before a more general discussion on moving 
budgeting research forward and directions for future research is presented. 
First, I address how organizations deal with slack, followed by a discussion on 
participation and the involvement of individuals in managerial work. Second, similarities and 
differences between traditional budgeting research and Beyond Budgeting research are 
discussed to systematize some of the main points from both literatures. Finally, I conclude by 
suggesting where BB may theoretically benefit from drawing on TB research, and where BB 
offers avenues for theoretical development. 
Considering the objective of this paper is to enable better positioning of BB research, 
the study of problems with budgeting serves as an introduction to TB literature that is concerned 
with similar issues as emerging BB literature. Consequently, it is the review of proposed 
solutions and consequences for PMS that is the focus for the remainder of this paper. Departing 
from budgeting problems, the discussion of proposed solutions highlights where the dispersed 
literatures converge and diverge. 
4.1. Dealing with Slack 
Budgets are being used to control both resource spending as well as organizational members, 
and their failure to do so is multifaceted. Much research is concerned with how environmental 
uncertainty, task difficulty, and pressures to meet budgets incentivize workers to create slack 
(e.g., Chow et al., 1991; Waller, 1988). The building of budgetary slack is one of the main 
criticisms towards TB (Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018), and is consequently heavily researched 
within management accounting (Daumoser et al., 2018). 
There are many reasons for building slack. One of them is that the budget is set (often 
a long time) in advance, and the uncertainties about future resource requirements drive people 




make sure that they at least have enough resources available for doing their job and delivering 
as expected (Onsi, 1973). Pressure to meet budget increases the propensity to build slack and 
inspires gaming behavior (Lal et al., 1996), and this is particularly salient when pay is tied to 
performance targets (Chow et al., 1991). 
In TB, the budget numbers are often considered to simultaneously serve as both a 
forecast as well as a performance target (Lyne, 1988; Schiff & Lewin, 1970; Searfoss, 1976). 
In BB, the separation of forecasts and performance targets is proposed as a way to reduce 
gaming behavior, particularly if the performance target serves as the basis for performance pay 
(Nguyen et al., 2018). 
Nevertheless, pay for performance is generally discouraged in BB (Nguyen et al., 2018). 
Divorcing conflicting purposes does not necessarily improve organizational performance, as 
the budget games (i.e., negotiation) that arise may improve communication (Christiansen & 
Skærbæk, 1997), relieve pressures of work intensification (Uddin & Hopper, 2001), and 
improve subordinate coordination (Arnold & Gillenkirch, 2015). Hence, it may not be the case 
that separating budgets into forecasts and targets is sufficient. 
From the discussion above, it is not clear that the untangling of conflicting purposes 
will solve issues in budgeting, and BB researchers should therefore study how organizations 
can deal with the negative consequences of slack without simultaneously stifling 
communication, coordination, and creativity. In this regard, traditional budgeting research (e.g., 
Davila & Wouters, 2005) can shed light on the facilitation of managerial flexibility in control 
systems. 
4.2. Purposeful Participation 
Participation is proposed as a way of dealing with misrepresentation, gaming, and slack 




positively influences performance are abundant and confounding. Job involvement is one 
example of participation, and when organizational commitment is high, it appears that 
participation reduces slack, whereas the opposite is true when organizational commitment is 
low (Nouri, 1994). Thus, participation as a means in itself is not sufficient in dealing with 
adverse behavior. 
Sponem and Lambert (2016) found that when participation and managerial involvement 
is high, budgets are less criticized. Hence, involving people in decision-making, target setting, 
etc. may reduce internal resistance. The long-term effect of participation is unknown, as some 
researchers have discovered that information about past performance is just as effective in 
reducing slack (Chow et al., 1991). 
Negotiation is another aspect of participation, and involving organizational members in 
settling budget targets may reduce slack (Fisher et al., 2000). However, as many authors have 
shown, failed negotiations, negotiations ending in unilateral decisions, and ritualistic 
participation for legitimating purposes may have detrimental effects on performance, as well as 
introducing decoupling and hypocrisy into the PMS (Brunsson, 1993; Fernandez-Revuelta 
Perez & Robson, 1999; Fisher et al., 2000). If negotiations fail and a decision is reached 
unilaterally, the communication of a rationale for the subordinates’ lack of involvement may 
have positive effects on performance (Libby, 1999). 
Thus, when researchers, for instance, study BB organizations and radical 
decentralization, they could draw inspiration from extant research within TB to theorize about 
ways of facilitating participation and decentralization of decision power. 
4.3. Make Budgeting Great Again – Similarities and Differences 
The most obvious divergence in the literature is that TB studies focus specifically on some of 




whereas BB studies take a broader look at similar issues. TB research appears to be more 
concerned with isolating specific issues within budgeting and attempting to improve budgeting, 
whereas BB research takes a more holistic and processual view in which budgeting as a whole 
is considered flawed and needs to be replaced by a number of tools and mechanisms. 
Still, it is not clear that BB is less invasive on an individual level (even though the most 
radical suggestion to abolish individual performance pay may have such an effect), and control 
may be even stricter under BB. With output controls, there is less opportunity to preemptively 
build slack, and this may increase pressure on performance. BB seeks to alleviate this somewhat 
through hindsight, but adding hindsight also reintroduces subjectivity and provides 
opportunities for post-hoc negotiations. Further, internal performance benchmarks provide 
many opportunities for internal competition, and it is not clear that this does not result in inter-
departmental gaming behavior similar to the much-criticized budget games. 
Considering the complex nature of organizational structures and business environments, 
communication may be one of the keys to discourage and reduce unwanted behavior such as 
gaming and slack building, as well as an important step in learning more between departments 
and functions in complex organizations. Participation, decentralization, and empowered 
employees only seem to work when the organization facilitates the thoughtful exchange of 
ideas, as well as sharing of successes and failures. Perhaps an underwhelming conclusion, 
managing performance, particularly in complex organizations and dynamic environments, is 
difficult. The search for the ultimate tool, the technique of philosophy leads to a variety of 
projects and proposed solutions, and these may be right for some organizations at a specific 
point in time and for a particular purpose, but as this review has illustrated, it is naïve to expect 
one perfect solution that works for all organizations over time. 
Initiative, communication, and change itself may be the drivers of performance 




performance management is not lost on us, and it may be useful to remind ourselves about the 
importance of context; “management accounting and other performance measurement practices 
need to be evaluated not just from an economic perspective, but from a social, behavioral and 
managerial perspective, within an overall organizational context” (Otley, 1999, p. 381). 
Beyond Budgeting has long suffered from a problem with defining what it is. Often, the 
lack of definition leads us to a definition of what it is not, namely budgeting. I argue that this 
view is wrong and that BB is indeed part of budgeting. As this review has shown, BB and TB 
are concerned with many of the same issues and a number of the proposed solutions overlap. 
By defining BB from what it is not, BB is often (inadvertently) seen as the counterpart to 
budgeting (Libby & Lindsay, 2010), and BB becomes this rebel youth that intends to disprove 
all of TB. By doing so, practitioners and researchers run the risk of a couple of things. 
First, many BB articles build on incorrect assumptions. The assumption that budgets are 
only bad, evil, or useless discards valuable knowledge from respected research over many 
years. Rather than starting from scratch, BB should look to previous research on budgets and 
identify from where it is possible to make constructive contributions to theory. If not, 
researchers risk kicking at an open door. 
Second, by separating BB from TB, the community shrinks significantly and BB may 
remain a fringe area on the outskirts of mainstream budgeting and PMS research. This review 
has uncovered several areas in which BB may learn from TB, but it has also identified several 
ways in which BB may contribute to TB. Becker et al. (2016) argue that a discussion around 
different budget purposes such as planning, resource allocation, and performance evaluation 
may improve the untangling and understanding of management control practice and that rather 
than focusing on practice-defined concepts, researchers should debate objectively around 




Schiff and Lewin (1970, p. 260) offered some profound insight half a century ago; 
“participative advocates of management, just as the traditionalists before them, fail to consider 
the goal-directed nature of human behavior. The Taylorists neglected humans altogether, 
whereas the participative practitioners believe that all humans in organizations should be able 
to self-actualize”. In this paper, I argue that rather than engaging in a paradigm war between 
Beyond Budgeting and traditional budgeting, budgeting research as a whole, that is the process 
of budgeting involving human and organizational action (Covaleski et al., 2003), can be a strong 
contributor to wider PMS research if pulling in the same direction without being dogmatic. 
4.4. Directions for Future Research 
The most prevalent areas for future research are mentioned below. Previous (TB) research has 
shown that participation may both decrease and increase slack. Which insights may BB research 
provide to the participatory literature? Employee participation and employee empowerment 
seem to be closely related (Covaleski et al., 2003), but how are participation and empowerment 
linked, and where do they differ theoretically? Further, Slack may be both detrimental 
(sandbagging, departmental compartmentalization, etc.) and beneficial (flexibility, agility, 
creativity). How do BB organizations deal with the issue of slack, and is there a theoretical 
contribution to be made from this research? 
The role of accountants as business partners and translators in multi-level 
communication (Henttu-Aho & Järvinen, 2013; Østergren & Stensaker, 2011) may also provide 
interesting avenues for further research. Lyne (1992) showed how accountants were driving 
participation initiatives, and the same is the case for BB (Nørreklit & Kaarbøe, 2013). Why do 
accountants drive these initiatives? Is it because they see the challenges up close and are the 




(such as budget follow-ups, variance analyses, etc.) are automated and “mundane” accounting 
responsibilities wither? 
Finally, research on how behavioral biases, such as myopia, may be dealt with through 
PMS design offers interesting opportunities for further research. For instance, a great deal of 
social psychology and behavioral economics research study the effects of “nudging” and choice 
architecture on decision-making (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). When designing PMSs, what are 
the effects of data visualization, default settings, and transparency across organizations, 
departments, and individuals on use and performance? 
In terms of where BB may contribute to TB, it seems the notion of stretch goals, relative 
performance measures with hindsight, and resources available on demand are areas that warrant 
deeper investigation. In BB, mental models and assumptions about the individual are argued to 
be different from TB. This review uncovers that previous researchers (e.g., Argyris, 1953; 
Hofstede, 1968; Schiff & Lewin, 1970) were also interested in these issues, but that is no reason 
to abandon further research into social relationships, mindset changes, and the importance of 
communication and continuous change initiatives. Franco-Santos and Otley (2018) also call for 
further research on improvements in the design and use of PMSs with emphasis on managerial 
mental models. 
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Dealing with Setbacks: 
The Role of Hope in Changing Management Control Practice 
Christian Andvik, Daniel Johanson and Katarina Kaarbøe 
Department of Accounting, Auditing and Law 
NHH – Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway 
The purpose of this paper is to further develop the concept of hope in the accounting 
literature and explain how management control change proceeds, despite numerous 
setbacks. This paper investigates a previously neglected area where an organization 
continues to make efforts to implement a new management control practice, despite 
limited success. The paper develops a conceptual model of hope to demonstrate how 
management control change unfolds and influences the practices of accountants. 
Moreover, we apply the conceptual model to an illustrative empirical case. We find that 
hope plays an important role for accountants in the process of changing management 
control practice. We argue that the role of hope is to avoid apathy and despair and that 
ideals survive and generate action through sustained hope. First, we show how promises 
are used to promote ideals about the future. Second, we show how reframing techniques 
enable a revamping of change initiatives when setbacks ensue. In conclusion, we propose 
that unsuccessful attempts (i.e., setbacks) at changing practices do not have to result in 
reinforcements of old practices. Instead, resilient ideals allow ideas to be updated, which, 
through hope, can be a driver of continuous change initiatives. This is one of the first 
empirical papers on expressions of hope, setbacks, and management control practice 
change. The formulations of hopeful ambitions have generative powers that drive 
changes forward, even though ambitions are not immediately met. 






Then there is this thing about value creation. […] It was a whole lot of number crunching and 
little value added. […] We have a large program running now and that is what is going to take 
us into the future. (Corporate Controller) 
In this paper, we develop the concept of hope in an accounting setting. We argue that hope is 
an important concept for understanding how novel management control ideas incrementally 
change management control practice. Hope offers a possible explanation for how management 
control practices are evolving, and why accounting and control change is unlikely to come to a 
halt. The concept of hope in organizations allows for theoretical reflections on the powers of 
affect and the possibilities they encompass for deepening our understanding of changing 
management control practice. 
Accounting as an affective technology has been subject to increasing interest in extant 
research. For example, studies in accounting have addressed the relationship between 
accounting and emotions as a driver for change through passion (Baxter et al., 2019), 
confidence (Gendron & Bédard, 2006), fear and anxiety (Guénin-Paracini et al., 2014; Taffler 
et al., 2017), discomfort (Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013; Pentland, 1993), as well as creative 
engagement (Busco & Quattrone, 2015) and imagination (Boedker & Chua, 2013; Carlsson-
Wall et al., 2016). 
These studies help us understand how calculative technologies may mobilize emotions 
to influence action, yet there is a lack of studies focusing on how emotions (such as hope) 
instigate and sustain organizational transformations when introducing radically new 
management control ideas. Furthermore, most of the previous accounting and control literature 
theorizes emotions as an individual state. Instead, we build on the emerging stream of research 




and circulating across, and between, individuals (Boedker & Chua, 2013) – in our case, a group 
of accountants. 
This paper centers on the affective concept of hope, which has been described as an 
abstract, positive emotion, yet an “emotion on which all the other emotions of elation are 
grounded” (Kast, 1991, p. 135). Brunsson (2006, 2009) has made a substantial contribution to 
the mechanisms of hope in the organization literature. In recent studies, the relevance of hope 
and its connections with accounting is understood as a mechanism through which decisions are 
formulated, revised, and rationalized (Catasús et al., 2016; Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). 
Even though previous studies argue for a relationship between hope and accounting 
change, the area is less developed in terms of what role hope plays in dealing with setbacks and 
organizational failures. The main purpose of this paper is to further develop the concept of hope 
to advance extant research on changes in management control practices (Becker, 2014; Becker 
et al., 2020; Goretzki et al., 2013; Henttu-Aho, 2016). In this regard, we develop a model for 
empirically studying hope and demonstrate that model using an illustrative case study. 
Engaging with this gap in the academic literature and seeking to inform a practical 
challenge, we address the following two research questions: First, how can hope be further 
conceptualized and understood in the context of changing management control practice? 
Second, what role does hope play for management accountants in reframing ideals and 
sustaining action? 
The empirical part of the paper addresses a major organizational change aimed at 
increasing management accounting relevance and the development of new control practices in 
MailCo. The change contains a promise of revitalizing management control practice in the 





The change initiative was based on ideas from the Beyond Budgeting (BB) philosophy 
(Hope & Fraser, 2003; Wallander, 1999), where the ideal1 is to manage organizations and 
organizational actors on different parameters, with less (to no) emphasis on annual budgets. 
Continuous setbacks in MailCo’s efforts to change their control practices do not stop the 
organization from moving forward, even when they fail to achieve what they set out to do. 
We contribute to the literature on hope and its relationship to control practices (Catasús 
et al., 2016; Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016), especially regarding the introduction of new 
management control models, by providing a theoretical model and an empirical illustration of 
how management accountants in MailCo create hope for themselves and the rest of the 
organization, even as they realize that the transformation is not unfolding according to plan. 
In addition, our findings provide new insights into the management control practice 
literature (Becker, 2014; Becker et al., 2020; Goretzki et al., 2013; Henttu-Aho, 2016) by 
showing how the concept of hope relates to organizational transformation and new control 
practices. Unsuccessful attempts at changing institutionalized practices do not necessarily result 
in reinforcement of the old practices, instead, mechanisms of hope drive the change initiative 
forward, if only incrementally so. Hope is an instrumental feature of resilient change initiatives, 
and through forgiveness and forgetfulness (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016) learning and action 
contribute to the survival of the ideal. 
More generally, we contribute to the contemporary debate about the essence of 
management control change and the management accountant’s role (Boedker & Chua, 2013; 
Goretzki et al., 2013; Parker & Warren, 2017). We argue that management control change is 
much more than developing new techniques for decision-making and control. Our paper 
 
1 According to Merriam-Webster (n.d.), an ideal is a standard of perfection and ‘something that one 
hopes or intends to accomplish’. An idea can be a synonym for an ideal, but ideas are also defined as 
‘plans for action’. The conception of ‘ideal-types of management’ dates back to Max Weber (1958) 




demonstrates that management control change enables the imagination of a different future 
through mechanisms of hope and that the management accountant has an important role in 
creating and sustaining hope. 
Previous literature has illustrated the successful transformation of control practices 
(Goretzki et al., 2013; Henttu-Aho, 2016). Our case study contributes by illustrating how 
setbacks are handled to move past failure. We show the important role hope plays in having 
management accountants (as a profession across business units) pull in the same direction when 
introducing new organizational changes. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on hope and 
action, followed by research on changing control practices, directing attention to the need for 
accountants to be concerned about how they reflect on failures and setbacks. The third section 
offers a description of the research methodology. In the fourth section, we demonstrate the 
descriptive model using an illustrative case. Finally, in the fifth section, we discuss our findings 
and conclusions. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we develop a conceptual framework of the role hope plays in introducing 
changes to management control systems. In our model, hope is driving organizational 
transformation, designed to move management control practices forward, as hope generates 
positive affect and action (Catasús et al., 2016; Ludema et al., 1997). The model also 
incorporates other related concepts, such as promises, forgiveness, and forgetfulness 
(Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). 
We are interested in the role of hope in organizational transformation and changes in 
management control practices. When going through the literature we have identified that 




Hopwood, 1973). More recently, there is an emerging stream of research that more explicitly 
focuses on emotions, and whether and how they influence calculative design and practice 
(Baxter et al., 2019; Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016; Carlsson‐Wall 
et al., 2020; Hall, 2016). As previously stated, the focal point of this paper is not individual 
emotions. Nevertheless, albeit an abstract emotion, hope is thought to be an emotion upon 
which all other positive emotions are founded (Kast, 1991). In this paper, we focus on the 
consequences of mechanisms of hope for organizational change. 
The section starts with a short review of literature on changing management control 
practices. Thereafter, the central concept of hope is theorized by drawing on an assortment of 
literature from accounting and organization theory to pastoral psychology. Finally, an 
illustrative model of hope and change is presented. The model is based on central concepts 
derived from the extant literature. 
2.1. Changing Management Control Practice 
In an early study, Lay (1928) wrote about the growth of the controller function in corporations 
and how that role corresponded with business-school education at the time. Anderson (1944, p. 
64) described the controller function as more than mere “routine recording and checking of 
business transactions and the assembling and reporting of cut-and-dried factual data”, while 
Simon et al. (1954) classified accounting roles into scorekeeping, attention directing and 
problem-solving in their work on centralization versus decentralization in controller 
departments. This early work on management control implicitly relates to the role of hope and 
the importance of “imagination and perspective” (Anderson, 1944, p. 64) in controllership. 
More recent studies have been concerned with the image and identity of the accountant, 
and the accompanying expectations about management accountants’ practices (Baldvinsdottir 




Paulsson, 2012; Picard et al., 2014; Wolf et al., 2020). For instance, Baldvinsdottir et al. (2009, 
p. 858) investigate accounting software advertisements and show how the image of accountants 
changed “from bean counters to extreme accountants” over a few decades. Paulsson (2012) 
highlights management reforms and the adoption of novel management accounting tools as 
important drivers of change in the role of management accountants. Picard et al. (2014) 
demonstrate a cultural shift from professionalism to commercialism in the accounting 
profession. Parker and Warren (2017) explore accountants’ presentation of professional identity 
in their attempts to overcome stereotypes about the profession. 
Most of the existing studies (e.g., Baldvinsdottir et al., 2009; Granlund & Lukka, 1997, 
1998) adopt a broad perspective to show how the image and expectations of accountants have 
changed over time, whereas in this study we are concerned with a radical reform aimed at 
changing management control practice at the organizational level. A common denominator is 
that the literature is concerned with the relevance of the profession, and the hope that 
management accountants can influence organizations. 
A few recent studies have explored the actual practices of management accountants and 
how their changing role in organizations alters control practices (Becker, 2014; Becker et al., 
2020; Goretzki et al., 2013; Henttu-Aho, 2016). Becker et al. (2020) discuss how core and 
peripheral actors have different motivations for accounting innovations and change, and that 
core actors (such as accountants) often envisage more radical frameshifts than peripheral actors. 
Goretzki et al. (2013) analyze the institutionalization of the business-partner role by focusing 
on the micro-processes and institutional work conducted by a powerful change agent – a new 
CFO. Their main finding is that the case firm they study carried out three interrelated kinds of 
work to support the institutionalization of the new role of the management accountants: 
(1) legitimising the new “business partner” role, (2) (re-)constructing the management 




institutional environment in which external actors aim to achieve changes in the 
management accountants’ role on a broader societal level. (Goretzki et al., 2013, p. 41) 
Henttu-Aho (2016, p. 48) shows that the introduction and implementation of rolling forecasts 
in an organization turned controllers into “experts in producing and delivering realistic, 
forward-looking information in the organization”. Hartmann and Maas (2011) explore the 
impact of uncertainty and the use of the budgetary system on the role of business-unit 
accountants. They argue that there are complementarities between budgetary systems and the 
role of management accountants. Other studies have demonstrated that, at times, management 
accountants do not live up to operational leaders’ expectations, and are consigned to providing 
useless and ritualized information (Morales & Lambert, 2013). 
As indicated by these studies, changes in management accounting and control systems 
have implications for the practices of management accountants. However, organizational 
changes rarely unfold according to plans or intentions (Brunsson & Olsen, 1997) and even 
though change initiatives are set in motion, accounting often “becomes what it was not” 
(Hopwood, 1983, p. 289). 
Some authors have challenged the premise that organizational reforms are based on a 
strong belief in the possibility to “change organizational structures, processes and ideologies 
from above and by rational choice and design” (Brunsson & Olsen, 1997, p. iii). According to 
Brunsson (1990), organizational decisions play at least one of the following roles: 1) mobilize 
action, 2) distribute responsibility, and 3) provide legitimacy. Brunsson (2009) claims that 
reforms are expressions of hope, while Catasús et al. (2016) study the role of hope in the 
realization of an accounting program, which can be understood as a reform. As decisions are 
an innate part of organizational change and given that an understanding of reforms will continue 
to be of importance to those wishing to understand modern organizations (Brunsson & Olsen, 




control change, promises, the willingness to forget and forgive, as well as revising the past and 
re-envisioning the future. 
2.2. Theorizing Hope 
Based on previous research, we have identified a need for more research on the relationship 
between hope and management control practices. In our case, we focus on how the positive 
emotion of hope influences the progression of management control change, despite continuous 
setbacks. In doing that, we do not only relate to psychological literature but also to theological. 
Authors within accounting have introduced the concept of hope as a mechanism through which 
decisions are formulated, revised, and rationalized (Brunsson, 2006, 2009; Catasús et al., 2016; 
Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). Hope is also a prominent concept in theology and pastoral 
psychology (Capps, 1995), the field of psychiatry (Clarke, 2003), as well as in organizational 
theory (Carlsen et al., 2011; Ludema et al., 1997). 
In its basic form, hope is a concept that is fundamental to human life. Brunsson (2006, 
2009) references Capps’ (1995) theological approach to the concept of hope and cites the Bible 
and St. Paul in his description of hope and its relationship with uncertainty: “Now hope that is 
seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see, we 
wait for it with patience” (Romans 8:24-25, English Standard Version). Extant literature 
establishes that uncertainty is a necessary condition for the existence of hope (Carlsen et al., 
2011; Golden-Biddle & Correia, 2012; Ludema et al., 1997). When outcomes are certain, there 
is no room, or need, for hope. In psychiatry, Clarke (2003) acknowledges that hope is 
commonly associated with religious discourse, but argues that it is a fundamental concept for 
human beings that involves a belief about uncertain things accompanied by an expectancy or 





Capps (1995) illustrates what he views as the three major threats to hope: despair, 
apathy, and shame. He also outlines the three major allies of hope: trust, patience, and modesty. 
According to Huy (2011), hope buffers against apathy and depression. Moreover, Capps (1995) 
provides two distinct reframing techniques that he suggests as tools for encouraging 
hopefulness and, thereby, avoiding despair. The first technique involves envisioning the future, 
while the second entails revising the past. Capps (1995) argues that these two techniques are 
particularly valuable for creating and sustaining hope because they are opposites on a temporal 
spectrum in which both the future and the past are reframed. According to Capps (1995), agents 
of hope are instrumental in building hope through reframing techniques and by protecting 
against the major threats to hope. 
Research on hope in organizations is considered underdeveloped (Carlsen et al., 2011) 
but Brunsson (2006) represents one of a few notable exceptions. Brunsson (2009) claims that 
reforms are expressions of hope – hope for a transformation of ideas into practices, hope for a 
rational organization, and ultimately, hope for a better, more efficient future. More precisely, 
the decision to undertake reform, or initiate radical accounting change, expresses the hope of 
turning ideas into action – actions that reflect ideals and principles (Brunsson, 1993, 2009). 
Brunsson’s comprehensive work (e.g., Brunsson, 2009; Brunsson & Olsen, 1997) on reforms 
and organizational decision-making underscores the difficulties of change processes, and he 
concludes that organizational changes are ongoing and sometimes never-ending processes that 
eventually turn into routine administrative practices. Van der Steen (2011) underscores that 
routines are embedded in complex social interactions that create order but that routines may 
also incite change in the routines themselves which leads to variations in practice. 
In the accounting literature on hope, Catasús et al. (2016) provide a detailed account of 
the three phases experts went through when developing performance indicators for a health 




other words, accounting affected action, while management through accounting was able to 
produce the desired outcome. In the second phase, Catasús and his colleagues (2016) show that 
the experts temporarily lost hope in accounting when the causal relationship between 
accounting (i.e., performance indicators) and action was challenged. Finally, hope was restored 
in the third phase, during which a transformation of the naïve hope and the questioning of 
causality culminated in a reflective hope that performance indicators have the potential to be 
valid, accurate, and relevant, ultimately leading to incremental, but uncertain, steps towards the 
desired action (Catasús et al., 2016). 
Mouritsen and Kreiner (2016) are also contributors to this area when they discuss hope 
as an outcome of decisions as promises. They use forgetfulness and forgiveness in a way similar 
to Capps’ (1995) descriptions of the two reframing techniques of revising the past and re-
envisioning the future. According to Capps (1995), revisioning allows us to place the past in a 
new frame of meaning (i.e., learn from previous experience), and learning is enabled through 
forgetting (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). Further, when the past “is no longer ‘the source of our 
problems” but the “resource for solutions’” (Capps, 1995, p. 170), we can envision a different 
future. This coincides with Mouritsen and Kreiner’s (2016) argument that forgiveness enables 
action.2 
Mouritsen and Kreiner (2016) present a novel perspective on the relationships among 
accounting, managerial work, and decision-making, as they view decisions as something more 
than the end product of a decision-making process. 
They conceptualize a decision as a promise that produces both a prediction about and a 
hope for, the future. Decisions as promises take into account the uncertainty about the future 
 
2 Influential philosophers Hannah Arendt (1958) and Paul Ricoeur (2004) provide foundations for the 
concepts of forgiveness and forgetfulness. For example, the concepts have been used to explain how 




and thus require both forgetfulness and forgiveness (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). Forgetting is 
necessary because any decision involves reducing complexity by focusing on agreed-upon and 
prescribed concerns at the time of decision-making. In other words, it is about forgetting all 
other concerns that may confound or interfere with action (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). 
Forgiveness is required in order to move on and allow for decisions to be revised as reality 
unfolds and new circumstances emerge (Arendt, 1958). Hence, forgiveness allows for revisions 
of the past (Capps, 1995) or the avoidance of practical experience (Brunsson, 2006), whereas 
forgetfulness allows us to simplify, adjust and re-envision the future (Capps, 1995; Ludema et 
al., 1997). 
Mouritsen and Kreiner (2016) relate the concepts of hope, decisions, and promises to a 
wider discourse in the contemporary era of knowledge economies. The notion of a promissory 
economy originates from the field of research based on the sociology of biosciences and 
bioeconomics (Haase et al., 2015; Martin, 2015). Literature on the promissory economy (e.g., 
Martin, 2015) distinguishes between regimes of truth and regimes of hope. Whereas regimes of 
truth are concerned with what is known in the present, regimes of hope require a belief in the 
future rather than an investment in the present. Thus, expectations play a key role in the 
development of, for example, new technologies, artifacts, and organizational forms. The 
performative role of, for example, expectations could also have a role in creating hope in 
organizations (Ludema et al., 1997). 
One conclusion drawn by Catasús et al. (2016) is that practitioners seem to accept the 
fact that organizational changes are rarely realized exactly as they were intended. This 
acceptance of unintended consequences and unattended hopes (Catasús et al., 2016) accentuates 





Without forgiveness, hope would wither, thereby dooming further progress, and sending 
decision-makers into hopelessness and apathy, which are arguably less desirable than imperfect 
actions. Forgiveness is not necessarily explicit, but it is a prerequisite for moving on, whether 
it is forgiving oneself for being too optimistic or forgiving someone else for not taking into 
account the complexities and uncertainties about the future. Mouritsen and Kreiner (2016) 
claim that the abandonment of a search for a technically reliable model of the world represents 
a case of forgetting, which is an interesting parallel to Catasús et al.’s (2016, p. 405) notion of 
reflective hope, where experience-based hope involves accepting “that the ideal outcome of an 
act may not be reached.” 
In summary, we know from both the psychology and the theology literature that hope 
positively influences action. Hope helps individuals when experiencing uncertainty, and 
through envisioning the future and revising the past, hope inspires action. However, hope can 
also be threatened by despair, apathy, and shame which indicates that hope is not easy to create 
and sustain. 
Within the existing research in accounting, Catasús et al.’s (2016) paper is the only 
empirical accounting paper that explicitly discusses hope. These authors examine the role of 
hope in realizing a program that aims to develop non-financial indicators and increase 
workplace health. Thus, their research is concerned with the construction of an accounting 
technology or, in other words, hope for the technology itself. Catasús et al. (2016) focus on 
three hope-related concepts (naïve hope, hopelessness, and reflective hope), as they add these 
concepts’ connectedness to three facets of uncertainty (validity, accuracy, and relevance). 
Our paper, although building and expanding on Catasús et al. (2016), takes a somewhat 
different approach to studying hope. Rather than studying a specific technology, this study 
empirically illustrates the ongoing efforts of management accountants in MailCo to change the 




2.3. An Illustrative Model of Uncertainty, Hope and Organizational Change 
We will now answer our first research question: How can hope be further conceptualized and 
understood in the context of management control change? 
Several important concepts relate to hope. In this regard, Figure 1 offers an illustrative 
model that connects these concepts and illustrates the role of hope in reframing ideals and 
sustaining action. The purpose of the model is to facilitate and structure the analysis of the 
empirical case study. 
 
Figure 1. Hope and Reframing of Ideals
Most fundamentally, the presence of uncertainty is a prerequisite for hope (Capps, 1995; 
Carlsen et al., 2011; Ludema et al., 1997). Uncertainty implies that any given decision is made 
as a more or less credible promise. When a decision is made as a promise, it produces both a 
prediction and hope (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). This hope is a combination of prediction and 




activating realistic imaginations of the future (Brunsson, 2009; Ludema et al., 1997). 
Novel management models offer the potential to create optimism in organizations, at 
least initially. Management control models and accounting techniques, such as balanced 
scorecards, ABC, and JIT, are often promoted as solutions to organizational problems. Some 
authors (Busco & Quattrone, 2015; Quattrone, 2017) discuss how accounting practices impart 
hope in users, and that accounting visualizations may motivate and engage. Huy (1999) argues 
that hope may be instilled through encouragement. In Figure 1, the imaginations of such models 
and techniques become the ideal, the promise which shall be realized in the future. Hope makes 
the true world seem realistic in the future (Brunsson, 2009). The ideal is also a plan for action 
(i.e., an idea), and the generativity of hope instigates change (Ludema et al., 1997). 
The inescapable unreliability of promises leads to unintended consequences, setbacks, 
and disappointments (Catasús et al., 2016; Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). As the future becomes 
the present and a prediction appears to have failed (it became what it was not), hope serves as 
a self-defense mechanism to avoid apathy, shame, and despair (Capps, 1995) and through 
reframing stabilizes our beliefs and assumptions. Revising the past (Capps, 1995) is an exercise 
of forgetting (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016) and avoiding practical experience (Brunsson, 2006), 
which enables learning (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). The rewritten past rationalizes setbacks 
as learning opportunities that give rise to a reflective hope (Catasús et al., 2016) of being 
forgiven (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). Forgiveness for past transgressions creates space for 
new hope to emerge. Through a re-envisioning, or re-imagining, of the future (Capps, 1995; 
Ludema et al., 1997), actors are allowed to make new promises (i.e., decisions) and thus sustain 
the hope of action (Capps, 1995; Catasús et al., 2016; Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016), thereby 
refueling the process. 
If forgiveness is not achieved, the initial promise must have been considered to 




carried out. In such a case, the promise does not produce hope. That lack of hope may lead to 
apathy, shame, and despair (Capps, 1995), which breaks the circle. Convincing promises may 
also fail in execution (and often do), but forgiveness is possible because the promise gave rise 
to hope and action. Even though that hope did not inspire the intended action, the prediction 
was genuine, and forgiveness allows the promise to be revised and, hence, the future to be re-
envisioned. Consequently, even failed attempts at change may generate new attempts at change, 
as long as the hope of a better world is sustained. Thus, a study of resilience and the surviving 
of ideals appears to be an appropriate extension to the scant literature on hope and change in 
management control. 
Figure 1 answers our first research question and summarizes the reasoning by 
illustrating the hope-inducing factors in the course of an organizational change process from 
making a promise (decision) to a potential restart through updated promises and visions of the 
future. 
As uncertainty is a necessary condition for the existence of hope, it is placed at the 
center of the conceptual model. Hope is the generative engine (Golden-Biddle & Correia, 2012) 
that drives the change initiative through all stages, as hopeful images of the future are “powerful 
catalysts for change and transformation by mobilizing the moral, social, and relational energies 
needed to translate vision into reality and belief into practice” (Ludema et al., 1997, p. 1025). 
Without uncertainty, there is no hope, and without hope, the cycle is broken. 
3. Empirical Setting and Research Methods 
In this section, the case organization is introduced, and the methodological choices are outlined. 
The case organization is referred to as MailCo which has been undergoing major 
organizational and accounting changes for a long time. In recent decades, MailCo faced 




decreasing volumes within an industry in which it had previously held a monopolistic position. 
The organizational changes were inspired by ideals and models from Beyond Budgeting and 
aimed to transform the management accountant from a traditional scorekeeper into a future-
oriented accountant-entrepreneur. MailCo struggled with the changes and experienced limited 
success and multiple setbacks. But instead of giving up, MailCo insisted on moving forward, 
which led us to explore the role of hope in the process of accounting change. 
3.1. History and Background 
At the time of the primary empirical work (2016), MailCo was a large, state-owned mail and 
logistics corporation in Scandinavia with approximately 19,000 employees, of which only 500 
were located outside the Nordic countries. With annual revenues of approximately USD 3 
billion, it was one of the largest companies and one of the largest employers in its home country. 
MailCo was organized in two segments (Mail and Logistics) with four business units/divisions 
(Mail, Logistics National, Logistics International, and eCommerce/online shopping). In 2009, 
MailCo not only decided to introduce a Beyond Budgeting-inspired management control 
system but also quite radically decided that 2010 would be the first year without annual budgets 
on a corporate level. This transition was the original motivation for this study. 
Established in the seventeenth century, MailCo has close to 400 years of experience in 
the distribution of mail and packages. MailCo was privately run for 72 years before the state 
assumed ownership in the early eighteenth century. MailCo remained an administrative agency 
of the government until it was converted into a special-law company in 1996. The conversion 
was a result of growth and structural changes in the marketplace. Its development was 
dominated by new technologies (e.g., email), new services, changes in customer preferences, 




In 2002, the government decided to make the organization an ordinary limited liability 
company in which the state maintained full ownership as the sole shareholder. At the time of 
the study, MailCo operated in a fully competitive market and had no remaining monopoly 
power. The distribution of letters weighing less than 50 grams was the last monopolized service 
to be exposed to competition, which occurred on 1 January 2016. Still, MailCo remained 
obligated to deliver mail to all addresses in its home market. As such, MailCo provided 
economically unviable services, and much of its success hinged on its ability to secure 
governmental purchases of unprofitable products and services. 
Recent public reforms and the privatization of MailCo had significant implications for 
its organizational structure, strategic focus, and operations. Historically a government service 
provider with monopoly power, MailCo had to deal with radical changes in its framework 
conditions. Digitalization is viewed as the toughest challenge for companies in the mail-
distribution industry and the volume of letters handled by MailCo was almost halved (48% 
decline) between 2000 and 2015. The rate of the decline was expected to increase in the years 
to come, with a total estimated further decline of 36% between 2015 and 2020. 
We study the push towards a BB-inspired management model, specifically focusing on 
how management accountants at different levels and units in MailCo view and interpret the 
changes, achievements, and setbacks during a long implementation period. We illustrate how 
control was practiced and conceived in MailCo, and the expressions of hope in this process. 
3.2. Research Methods 
The initial motivation for the research project was the opportunity to study an organization that 
sought to implement a management control model based on the BB philosophy. In particular, 
we wished to study the implications of a radical change in management control systems for 




organization viewed the change initiative as somewhat unsuccessful, which shifted our focus 
to why the organization continued its change-related efforts. We investigate the role of hope by 
capturing expressions of hope in MailCo when examining past and ongoing experiences with 
change. Respondents do not necessarily talk explicitly about hope when discussing change 
initiatives, but we show examples of how they mobilize reframing techniques to sustain 
momentum. 
The fieldwork was primarily conducted from April 2016 through October 2016, with a 
total of ten days spent within the organization, consisting of an initial one-day visit and three 
subsequent three-day visits. Data were collected using different methods; interviews (face-to-
face, phone, and video), participating observation, and secondary data. We strived to accrue 
longitudinal data by asking process questions predominantly from respondents with long 
careers (10+ years) in MailCo, probing into past change initiatives, reading historical 
documentation, and so on. We went back into the organization on multiple occasions and even 
followed up after four years (October 2020) to get the most recent update on the changes from 
the most central respondent in our study. A total of twelve semi-structured interviews lasting 
between 30 and 90 minutes were conducted. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
In addition to the formal interviews, the researcher on-site engaged in informal 
conversations with MailCo employees. Moreover, several debriefing sessions held with the 
main contact during the data-collection period offered valuable insights into the organization 
and generated secondary data sources for further analysis. The researcher responsible for data 
collection was provided with a desk in MailCo’s finance department, where internal documents 
were reviewed when not conducting formal interviews. This enabled the researcher to observe 
the daily work of finance personnel, as well as participating in informal communication, and 
obtaining a deeper understanding of the individual and shared emotions in this particular part 




During the primary data collection period, MailCo’s CEO resigned and there was a lot 
of tension in the finance department concerning the next CEO, which provided an interesting 
opportunity to assess the emotions of key actors in the ongoing reform initiative. The data 
collecting researcher also took part in discussions and lunches with finance department 
employees. Field notes and personal reflections were logged during the visits to MailCo. The 
observational notes describe informal talk among the interviewees, as well as between the 
interviewees and the researcher. 
Finally, a substantial part of the empirical work consisted of large secondary data set in 
which reviewing internal documents, such as board meeting minutes and confidential 
presentations, as well as publicly available information about MailCo, such as annual reports, 
public presentations, government reports, books written about the company and several 
newspaper articles. These secondary data were corroborated by statements made by 
interviewees to develop a coherent and plausible story about past and ongoing change initiatives 
in MailCo. The reading of secondary data also allowed the researcher to dig deeper into the 
accounts given by interviewees, which unearthed deeper feelings of, for instance, 
disappointment and hope. 
The data analysis was carried out abductively by moving back and forth among 
empirical data, theoretical concepts, and extant research until we were able to present a 
theoretically meaningful narrative that makes a distinct contribution to the literature (Lukka & 
Modell, 2010). The initial interviews revealed more general concerns about uncertainties 
related to MailCo, its environment, and implications for its management accountants. In later 
interviews, we focused on MailCo’s accountants (i.e., corporate), and how they experienced 
previous and ongoing change processes. In particular, we tried to understand why and how the 
current control reform kept moving forward even though the organization viewed the initiative 




relate to the concept of hope. Hence, in this paper, we examine the role of hope in a change 
initiative that explicitly addresses the role of management accountants and their future-
orientation. 
Lukka and Modell (2010) argue that the validity of an interpretive study is best assessed 
in terms of the authenticity and plausibility of its analysis. We have tried to achieve authenticity 
by including several examples of how MailCo tried to implement a change at different points 
in time, its interpretation of disappointment and failure, and its attempts to change a present 
setback into a future success. With regards to plausibility, we continuously refined our 
interpretations of the empirical material by drawing on existing theoretical concepts in the area 
of hope and promises. 
4. Empirical Illustrations of Changing Management Control Practice 
In the following, the empirical discussion revolves around the theoretical framework we 
developed earlier. The framework is visualized as a loop to illustrate how setbacks are 
countered by the allies of hope, and how a hopeful discourse allows the seemingly failing 
change initiative to develop and progress incrementally and evolutionarily. 
We focus on the future-orientation of the management accountants’ work, and we 
illustrate how hope played a part in management accountants’ development of new practices 
and in ensuring that the change initiative kept moving forward. In particular, decentralizing 
decisions, organizational power dynamics, and the pervasiveness of uncertainty in management 
accountants’ work are central in the empirical study. 
4.1. From Naïve Hope and Technical Focus to Reflective Hope and Organizational 
Development 




traditional annual budget. Initially, this idea was set in motion by the Group CFO [current CEO] 
with a small number of corporate controllers. Officially, MailCo never used the term Beyond 
Budgeting for their change, but it was inspired by the underlying philosophy as well as 
organizations that were members of the Beyond Budgeting Roundtable. Considering the 
conceptual ambiguity regarding what Beyond Budgeting really is (Nguyen et al., 2018), and 
the elasticity of the concept, we treat this change initiative as a move towards Beyond 
Budgeting. Interviewees in MailCo also use the term Beyond Budgeting from time to time, so 
it is clear that many of the involved actors view this as a BB initiative. 
4.1.1. Ideal: Future-Oriented and Business-Minded 
The adoption of this novel management philosophy was expected to help MailCo achieve its 
long-standing goal of becoming future-oriented and business-minded (#1-1), as many of the 
accountants saw themselves as adding little value to the organization (#1-2). Internal and 
external presentations from these early days of BB make it clear that MailCo viewed BB as a 
solution to many of its problems, and many figured it would be a quick and simple fix. In an 
informal conversation, one of the key actors in the BB project spoke about how MailCo 
observed other organizations and their reinvigoration of the management control function, 
which they discussed at different professional forums and conferences. These external 
inspirations (and propagators) of BB served as agents of hope that change agents within MailCo 
aspired to emulate: 
And we set things in motion quickly, buying into the problems with annual budgeting. It’s 
almost like a religious debate. That former General Electric CEO [Jack Welch] has a lot of 
good stuff. […] And we had Bjarte Bogsnes [Chairman of Beyond Budgeting Roundtable] 
come tell us about Beyond Budgeting. (#1-2, Controller) 




gaming and to separate the forecasting process from performance evaluations and bonuses: 
We should be able to constantly update our forecasts, on a daily basis. (#1-11, SVP) 
The decision entailed a promise to leave retrospection and detailed analyses in the past, and the 
ideal was to become forward-looking, dynamic, and focus the organization on the future (#1-
12). 
4.1.2. Change in Alignment of Strategy and Operational Activities 
Internal documents and presentations show that MailCo presented the new model as a solution 
to problems with coordination, data collection, management, and sub-optimal business 
situations. The new model was said to strengthen the link between strategy and action in 
MailCo, and the alignment processes were expected to ensure efficiency and agility. The model 
was discussed by the board, the top-management group, and employees in controller 
departments and various business units. Discussions in business forums, both internally and 
externally, demonstrated that MailCo was serious about building a management control system 
that operationalized strategy, set the direction for the future, and added value through 
streamlining and attention direction. This was all part of the enduring decentralization initiative, 
which was driven by increased competition, an emphasis on revenues rather than costs, and 
general concerns about an uncertain future. 
In the early days, the most prominent and tangible change was the removal of the annual 
budget and the introduction of rolling forecasts in MailCo: 
We started with rolling forecasts. (#1-1, Controller) 
The decision to abandon annual budgets was surprisingly frictionless and interviewees attribute 
this to the general perception of weaknesses in the budgeting process. Further, the initiative 




accountants across business units in MailCo: 
There were some concerns from the business units, that we had very comprehensive budget 
processes that took a lot of time. […] They [headquarters] quickly obtained support from 
us in the business units. (#1-3, CFO) 
After securing support for the change, MailCo spent a long time trying to find the best way 
forward for forecasting. 
4.1.3. Setbacks in Changing Control Practice – Focus on Technical Details 
As time passed, it became clear that MailCo was not achieving its expectations for several 
reasons, including a lack of top-management support and a failure to change the mindsets of 
management accountants in the organization. The budgets remained an integral and central part 
of MailCo’s management control practices. In fact, most of the interviewees struggled to see 
the difference between forecasts and budgets: 
The difference between the two [budget and forecast] seems academic. (#1-5, CFO) 
 
Then you have the overall budget, or forecast, which is what we are supposed to be calling 
it. (#1-3, CFO) 
 
When fall arrives, we set up a forecast. But what we are really doing is locking in a budget! 
(#1-4, CFO) 
The issues arising were partly due to ambiguous management support. Officially, corporate 
management was fully on board with the changes, however, formal conversations revealed that 
one problem with removing budgets and detailed reports was that the CEO loved details. 
Furthermore, the rolling forecast process was undermined by governance issues, as the board 




In the autumn, we sometimes have had to do penalty laps to achieve alignment with what 
is supposed to be the board’s version in December. This is because the board locks in the 
budget, at least from my perspective. (#1-3, CFO) 
 
Everything is reporting here. [Departing CEO] loves reports. They love to read. The more 
the merrier. Preferably 1,000 pages to corporate management. No bullet points, all in long-
form. (#1-11, SVP) 
The indirect lack of top management and board support destabilized the management 
accountants’ work on predicting the future, and forecasts were no longer predictions about 
likely outcomes but rather negotiated targets for a given period. The negotiations have the 
potential to displace the prediction and desire components of promises: 
And then we settle on delivering the same [forecast] as last period. Until we receive new 
information. (#1-6, Manager) 
Another perceived setback is the failure to become more flexible and dynamic but falling back 
into a focus on technicalities and details. Controllers are spending an inordinate amount of time 
and resources on these forecasts, without necessarily seeing any returns in terms of value: 
I think the challenge in our company is that we have a way too comprehensive data capture, 
too many reports, and then we don’t know what is really important and what to use. (#1-
11, SVP) 
 
In retrospect, I believe we got hung up on rolling forecasts, details, and technicalities. We 
were too focused on the technical. (#1-12, Controller) 
 
In practice, we are working with forecasts all year round. We are never done. It is extremely 
demanding, in terms of effort [versus value]. You never get to do what you should really 
do. (#1-4, CFO) 
With a lot of attention directed towards the technical details of forecasting, MailCo ended up 




how often to update them, and so on: 
The “end-of-year syndrome” was brought into our forecasting processes. We quickly 
moved towards four budget processes every year, instead of becoming more dynamic. (#1-
12, Controller) 
 
In practice, we have three forecasts every year now. No one cares about the one in February. 
They may care a little more about the one in May. Then we put ten times the effort into the 
September forecast… because it is a budget! (#1-11, SVP) 
 
We have three forecasting periods. After a lot of back and forth. We started with four, but 
we ended up with a lot of discussions about what and when to deliver. (#1-2, Controller) 
In addition to the setbacks with regards to forecasting, MailCo also struggled with following 
through on the flexibility in decision-making and resource allocation. Even though they tried 
to allocate resources based on business cases and net present value-calculations of projects, a 
stringent framework remained. Controllers lost power as the focus shifted towards detailed 
reporting over valuable decision support, and some did not see real change in how they worked: 
There are very strict limits to our mandates. (#1-3, CFO) 
 
After removing budgets, controllers have lost their power. (#1-8, Manager) 
 
We are working with the same things we have always worked with. (#1-10, Manager) 
The leader of the corporate controlling unit was presented with some of the disconnects between 
early promises about dynamism and flexibility, and the enduring issues around rigidity and 
focus on details. Retrospectively, they explained why the initial presentations were not 
representative of a realistic change process: 
I was the one who made that presentation, but it’s all bull$**t! It is the kind of stuff you 
write in a memo because it sounds good, but it is just copied from some slides made by 




Distancing themselves from the setback allows them to rationalize the preceding process and 
instead focus on what they learned underway. 
4.1.4. Revising the Past – Rationalizations and New Plans 
Setbacks, such as those presented in the previous section, could have proven to be detrimental 
blows to the change initiative in MailCo. But rather than giving up, the actors continued to view 
the ideal of a flexible and dynamic control system in MailCo as desirable and attainable: 
So, you have a look at yourself and conclude that this is not working and start discussing 
how to avoid falling back into old habits. (#1-12, Controller) 
To avoid despair and apathy, some of the central actors in the project changed their discourse 
around the project and how they would become more dynamic. The focus on the ideal future, 
in which accountants would serve as coaches to operational personnel (#1-12) and provide 
forward-looking, decision-relevant information survived by reframing the past: 
The intention was good, but we never really made it to rolling forecasts. (#1-11, SVP) 
 
I have no trouble understanding the intention with forecasts, and I share the intention, but 
as an organization, we face a dilemma. The incentives are built around targets and target 
attainment. […] I think the idea about rolling forecasts is correct, but the dilemma is how 
we handle the multi-level incentive issues. There is still a hierarchy, and if you are holding 
people responsible you depend on them trusting the system. (#1-5, CFO) 
Some of the key actors nuance the past and claim that they never really thought this would be 
a quick fix. Their initial and naïve assumptions about the efficacy of the proposed changes are 
turning into reflective hopes about what management control in MailCo might become with 
time: 
Initially, we assumed this would be done much faster. We thought the system would fix 




about management control. We needed to rethink what performance information really is 
to us. (#1-12, Controller) 
As an alternative to solely focusing on what went wrong, these actors offered rationalizations 
for what went wrong, but also new ideas (i.e., plans for action and re-imaginations of the future). 
4.1.5. Envisioning the Future – Continuous Change 
Moving towards a more reflective hope for accounting change, management accountants 
sustain hope for the ideal but their ideas about how to get there are significantly moderated: 
We have a large program running now and that is what is going to take us into the future. 
(#1-2, Controller) 
No longer believing in swift, radical change, the accountants start focusing on change as a 
process towards a better future (rather than a product and final solution): 
It works the day we have an agile forecasting process. When everyone sees it as a forecast, 
and not a budget. (#1-2, Controller) 
 
We matured. A well-functioning control system must open up and be transparent. Now, I 
don’t know if we will ever be done. (#1-12, Controller) 
During one of our visits to MailCo, news broke about who would replace the recently resigned 
CEO. As many (including the management accountants) had hoped, it was MailCo’s sitting 
CFO who was promoted to CEO. Through our presence in the corporate controlling department, 
we were able to observe the collective relief and joy that emerged as employees learned that 
the board had decided to promote the CFO, whom they all knew well. Several employees in the 
department indicated their hope that this meant their work would be higher on the agenda and 
be more appreciated than before. It also meant that their efforts to change accounting practices 





What we are doing now… if it is executed as we think, or hope, then I believe we are really 
making progress. (#1-2, Controller) 
 
I believe [Oncoming CEO, Current CFO] is different, but time will show. They may very 
well be eaten by the bureaucracy as well. (#1-11, SVP) 
I really do not hope so! (#1-11, Controller) 
I do not hope so either.’ (#1-11, SVP) 
This last conversation illustrates how the ideal future with rolling forecasts and a BB-inspired 
management model lives on and survives the many setbacks they experienced underway. One 
manager discusses how the strategy for management control in MailCo was focused on what 
they should become, without explication how to get there: 
I believe this is better than what we did in 2012 where we had 160 PowerPoint slides and 
a prefabricated template to fill in. That was a static report about what MailCo was, and 
what it should become. But I was unable to decipher what we were supposed to do [i.e., 
action]. (#1-11, SVP) 
The lack of ideas, or plans for action, led the ideal to seem unattainable and unrealistic. Still, 
the accountants did not lose faith in their mission to regain relevance and provide value and 
flexibility, but experience leads them to be cautious in the hopes for how and when they will 
achieve what they set out to do: 
I have not given up. I am completely certain that the basic ideal is the correct one. (#1-11, 
Controller) 
 
Initially, we assumed this would be done much faster. Now, I don’t know if we will ever 
be done. (#1-12, Controller) 
Acknowledging that change takes time, the mindset shifts towards a process orientation and 




As the CEO stated in an internal presentation, “Arduous restructuring towards a new reality and 
dramatic downsizing in a time of automation and the internet requires that things progress in a 
process. It takes time.” 
Experiencing the setbacks and extracting learning from these, a more reflective hope 
emerges in MailCo. They are still adamant about the need for change, and that the ideal is to 
become more flexible and dynamic, as well as restoring the management accountants’ relevance 
in the organization: 
If you go and talk to them about how they do it in [BU1] and how they do it in [BU2] and 
[BU4], I know that you will get different stories. Because they work in different ways. 
They may even tell you that they do it one way, but that one way is only part of the truth. 
However, they talk about it as if they do everything in the same way. But there are different 
levels of details, and different cultures that need to be reconciled. (#1-4, CFO) 
 
We failed at organizational development. We did not work with the integration of the 
control model, and failed to create a package of strategy, forecasts, and KPIs. (#1-12, 
Controller) 
 
We still have a way to go before this works. […] I am concerned with building a system 
that provides freedom and autonomy, but the condition is that we have trust in the 
organizational structures. I believe we are moving in the right direction with the things we 
do now, and we might get there eventually. (#1-5, CFO) 
 
The most important thing is culture. Number one! We have come a long way from the early 
years where we thought this would be a quick fix. (#1-9, Manager) 
 
But there is a huge potential. To learn more from one another and help each other. We are 
not talking a lot to each other [across business units]. (#1-3, CFO) 
Most of the interviewees are still hopeful for future change, and they are displaying reflective 
hopes about the future. Acknowledging how the organization is not immediately rigged for 




forward. In the beginning, many thought this change would be swift and solve many of the 
issues MailCo struggled with around annual budgets, but after years of setbacks, they are now 
more nuanced. Rather than seeing a new management control model as a solution, the 
accounting-action link was thought of as an evolution of control practices more than a 
revolution. 
4.2. Summary of Findings 
Initially, the decision to abandon traditional budgeting in favor of a BB-inspired control system 
produced enthusiasm and hopes for improved decision-making and financial performance, with 
optimistic presentations (both internally and externally) of a management model that would 
solve the organization’s problems through rolling forecasts, flexible resource allocation, and 
decentralized decision-making. Discontent set in as rolling forecasts became a comprehensive 
budget process and performance indicators were chiefly used for reporting purposes. One of 
the managers expressed great frustration over how even the strategy process turned into a 
reporting exercise. 
Rather than facilitating good forecasting, flexibility, and value creation, management 
accountants initially become more interested in the technical details of the change than 
substantive change. Forecasts and targets were indistinguishable from annual budgets and, 
during the first years, accountants were facilitating a negotiated target-setting process more than 
forecasts as truly updated expectations about future performance. By the end of this initial stage 
of the change project, the new model was presented as a slowly evolving solution (i.e., 
evolution) rather than a quick fix (i.e., revolution). As Catasús et al. (2016) would suggest, the 
hope of an accounting-action link became more reflective, and BB was no longer the solution 




5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this study is to develop the concept of hope and explain how management 
control change processes proceed, despite continuous setbacks. Building on extant literature 
within accounting, organizations, psychology, and theology (Brunsson, 2006; Capps, 1995; 
Carlsen et al., 2011; Catasús et al., 2016; Ludema et al., 1997; Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016), we 
theorize about hope and management control change, and their relationship with uncertainty, 
decision-making, change, setbacks and reframing techniques (Figure 1). Empirically, we study 
an organization (MailCo) and its move towards dynamic management control, inspired by 
Beyond Budgeting ideals. Despite the limited success of the change initiative and the 
continuous setbacks, the project slowly progressed. As such, the current study demonstrates the 
role of hope in avoiding despair and coping with uncertainty when creating new management 
control practices. More broadly, we contribute to a general debate about the expressions of hope 
and their role in imagining new potentialities for management control practice. 
5.1. Understanding Hope in the Context of Changing Management Control 
Practice 
In our theoretical conceptualization of hope and accounting change, we confirm the important 
link between accounting and action, which culminated in Figure 1. Merging accounting 
literature with organizational and theological literature, we further develop and theorize that 
hope is an integral part of change processes. Hope is a component of decision-making through 
the making of promises. These promises constitute both predictions and desires (Capps, 1995; 
Clarke, 2003; Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016), manifested in imaginations of perfect futures and 
ideals. 
If these promises appear credible, agents of hope may form ideas and plans for action 




disappointments and setbacks, which are sources of apathy, despair, and inaction. When 
progress is threatened, hopeful reframing techniques allow organizational change agents to 
revitalize the initiative and sustain action. 
Importantly, however, hope in a management control context is very important since we 
know from previous studies that changes rarely unfold according to plans and intentions, and 
accounting change often has unintended consequences (Hopwood, 1983). Moreover, in a recent 
study of internal crowdsourcing, Di Vincenzo et al. (2020) show how ideas are more likely to 
survive when the attention surrounding ideas is positive. This indicates that a positive 
atmosphere is important when introducing new management control practices. 
Furthermore, previous studies demonstrate that, at times, management accountants do 
not live up to operational leaders’ expectations, and are consigned to providing useless and 
ritualized information (Morales & Lambert, 2013). This is similar to Mouritsen and Kreiner’s 
(2016) exemplification of a coercive system in which forgiveness is refused and the decision is 
forced to be restored, turning promise into despair when it becomes evident to the organization 
that not everything can be forgiven or forgotten. 
However, our findings show that when MailCo decided (i.e., promised) to leave 
traditional budgeting and implement rolling forecasts, it created an image of an ideal future in 
which accountants were valuable resources, wherein they would serve as coaches and educators 
to operational personnel. Through experience and setbacks, the accountants realized that the 
initial ideal was built on unrealistic expectations of what these changes would achieve in 
isolation. At this moment, the promise could have “died”, and the organization could have 
concluded that the project was a failure. But this is not what happened. 
Instead, hope allowed the ideal (i.e., dynamic, flexible, and relevant control practices) 
to survive, even though their conception of how to get there changed. Change agents became 




meant to be a quick fix”) and envision a future in which organizational development will help 
them towards the ideal future. 
5.2. Hope – Moving Beyond Setbacks Together 
In addition, we contribute to the empirical literature on change in management accounting and 
control practices, especially new management accounting and control models (Becker, 2014; 
Becker et al., 2020; Goretzki et al., 2013; Henttu-Aho, 2016), by providing an empirical 
analysis of how management accountants mobilize hope to transform ideas into action, even 
when they realize that a change process is not unfolding according to plan. The empirical 
account illustrates the long and arduous process of incremental improvements. 
We argue that unsuccessful attempts at changing institutionalized practices do not 
necessarily result in reinforcement or reintroduction (Becker, 2014) of the old practices. 
Instead, mechanisms of hope – in the shape of revising the past and re-envisioning the future – 
drive the change initiative forward, if only incrementally so. 
Previous studies have shown how management accountants successfully change 
accounting and control practices. We agree with previous research that the process is important 
(Goretzki et al., 2013) but not only in a deterministic way. Instead, the group of accountants 
and their sensemaking has a large influence. If succeeding in creating a positive atmosphere of 
hope, this can inspire people to take an interest in solving the problem. These intentions to 
change are inherently uncertain and management’s role is thus to present imaginations of an 
improved future for scorekeeping, attention directing, and problem-solving. 
We emphasize how hope provides an opportunity to move past failure and focus on 
future improvements, over and over again. Rather than discarding “failed” ideas, the ideal 




and what does not, ultimately leading to incremental improvement. We show how revising the 
past is helping MailCo to learn from the past and to envision a new and improved future. 
Similar to Catasús et al. (2016), we show how change initiatives may initially be 
premised on naïve hope, and only after collective learning from past experience is this naiveté 
substituted by a more nuanced discourse and reflective hope. Analogous to Catasús et al. 
(2016), we also illustrate how organizational actors move from discussing details and 
techniques to process and organizational development. 
However, contrary to Catasús et al. (2016), we focus more on why setbacks are not 
necessarily the death of projects, but opportunities for reframing ideals and modifying ideas. 
Rather than focusing on the rationalization process towards a different understanding of what 
the end product is, we show how the process of predicting and making promises (that produce 
hope) evolves to cater to an ideal that remains unchanged. 
Thus, even as an organization may progress through the three stages of hope (naïve, 
hopeless, and reflective), we show how the reflective hope may relate to the process (i.e., ideas) 
rather than the product (i.e., ideal). Catasús et al. (2016), studied how the understanding of an 
ideal changed (through reflective hope, PRISMA [the empirical case in the paper] became 
something else), whereas we study the changing understanding of ideas. The ideal (i.e., 
dynamic MC) is constant, but their understanding of how to get there evolves. 
Like Brunsson (2009, p. 152), we show how hope allows us to “exist in two worlds 
simultaneously; a world of ideas and a world of practice.” Learning from past failures enables 
MailCo to re-imagine its way towards a more dynamic future. Acknowledging that the world 
of practice is riddled with challenges and setbacks, MailCo is still able to simultaneously live 
in the ideal world. This indicates that change processes require access to the collective memory 
of the organization to successfully navigate multiple iterations of incremental progress. This 




external consulting agencies and their success in implementing change. Initiating a project (with 
a start and end date) is difficult when the organization is continually going through an 
evolutionary process of change. Addressing a cross-section of this process is difficult and 
somewhat naïve, as it does not as much seek forgiveness and learning as it provides a “final” 
(and imperfect) solution. 
These insights about hope and organizational change as never-ending processes may 
seem disheartening, but it may very well be the best one can hope for. Getting to initiate a 
change in itself may be considered the most important step forward. As one of our respondents 
in MailCo put it, “That may very well be the biggest bottleneck. To win acceptance [for the 
initiative],” (#1-3, CFO). According to Mouritsen and Kreiner (2016, p. 26), “[t]he ultimate 
success of a project is perhaps that it becomes a project, i.e., that somebody decides to commit 
time, effort, and money to it.” 
An interesting avenue for future research lies in taking a closer look at how emotions 
influence management accounting and control practice and focus more in-depth on the role of 
hope in accounting. The relationship between learning, forgiveness, and hope is central to 
produce reflective hope, and this could be elaborated on in future studies. In contrast to most 
other emotions, the concept of hope is also based on ethics (e.g., Capps, 1995) and humans 
have moral obligations to move on, and not to give in to despair. The ethical implications of 
hope as a generative concept could be interestingly developed in future research. 
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Appendix A: List of Interviews 
Interview Position Unit Duration 
#1-1 
CFO 




Corporate/Group 75 minutes 
Controller 
#1-3 CFO Business Unit 1 75 minutes 
#1-4 CFO Business Unit 3 60 minutes 
#1-5 CFO Business Unit 2 75 minutes 
#1-6 Manager – Controlling Business Unit 2 90 minutes 
#1-7 Manager – Investments Business Unit 2 30 minutes 
#1-8 Manager – Accounting Business Unit 1 90 minutes 
#1-9 Manager – Business 
Development 
Business Unit 1 45 minutes 
#1-10 Manager – Controlling Business Unit 1 45 minutes 
#1-11 
Controller 
Corporate/Group 75 minutes Finance Director – 
Corporate Staff (SVP) 
#1-12 Controller Corporate/Group 60 minutes 
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As management control systems evolve, the dual purposes of management control lead 
to rising tensions in control elements. These tensions manifest themselves in a multitude 
of ways, and one stream of literature dealing with this is research on enabling and 
coercive control. As contemporary organizations increasingly pursue radical 
decentralization, these issues take on different forms. Consequentially, control elements 
are distributed beyond the realm of managers, leaving employees to self-manage and 
middle managers in a plight. In such settings, we are concerned that perceptions of 
enabling design characteristics may differ from what is previously assumed. Thus, we 
investigate how employees and middle managers make sense of enabling control 
elements in a radically decentralized organization. Because we study the individual 
perceptions at an operational level, we draw inspiration from the self-management 
literature within organization and psychology research. We contribute to the control 
literature by showing how enabling design characteristics are perceived and used 
coercively when controls are distributed to an employee level. We also show that middle 
management is instrumental in the success of self-managing employees. In addition to 
examining middle managers who are traditionally active users of the MCS, we also study 
employees that are not conventional users of MCS. 







Managers love empowerment in theory, but the command-and-control model is what they 
trust and know best. (Argyris, 1998, p. 98) 
As organizations face turbulent environments, some argue that the traditional command and 
control paradigm is challenged and that organizations must develop alternative approaches to 
management control that empower self-regulated employees (Kaarbøe et al., 2013). As a result 
of radical decentralization (O’Grady, 2019), contemporary organizations are experimenting 
with novel approaches to management control. As management control systems (MCS) evolve, 
corporations are pursuing management models that facilitate transparency, flexibility, 
efficiency, and self-regulation (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Bogsnes, 2013). 
Beyond Budgeting (BB) is emerging as an empirical phenomenon of great practitioner 
interest (Bogsnes, 2009, 2013), as well as an interesting arena for academic research 
(Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013; Libby & Lindsay, 2010; Nguyen et al., 2018). BB is claimed 
to be a management philosophy (Bogsnes, 2009; Hope & Fraser, 2003), and not merely about 
the removal of traditional budgets. Propagators of BB argue that the principles of the philosophy 
help organizations “towards a more dynamic, flexible and self-regulating management model” 
(Bogsnes, 2013, p. 11). Analogously, management accounting research seeks to develop the 
concept of control and the design of control elements, by introducing notions such as employee 
empowerment, learning and flexibility to studies on management control (Berry et al., 2009; 
Chenhall, 2003). Some recent studies focus on dynamic tensions in management control 
elements, intentions, attention, and paradoxes of control elements being simultaneously 
complementary and substitutive (e.g., Doornich et al., 2019; Henri, 2006; Van der Kolk et al., 
2020; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008). 
Performance measurement systems (PMS) are formalized structures through which an 




(2004) draw on Adler and Borys’ (1996) typology of enabling and coercive formalizations and 
show how enabling bureaucracies advance the control concept, as it facilitates the dual purpose 
of flexibility and efficiency simultaneously. Adler and Borys (1996) contend that it is not the 
degree of formalization, but rather the underlying philosophy that is central in directing control 
as either a constraint or as a resource for employee autonomy. 
By integrating autonomy and radical decentralization in the concept of control, 
management control systems become something else. BB discourse (particularly practitioner-
oriented) often argues that budgeting is imperfect and that BB can fix these problems through 
a different approach, built on trust, empowerment, and transparency (Bogsnes, 2009). Jordan 
and Messner (2012) address the problems of incomplete performance measures and the 
implications for the design characteristics of control elements by drawing on the literature on 
enabling and coercive bureaucracies. 
Much of the research on enabling formalizations (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Jordan & 
Messner, 2012) and adaptions to local contingencies (Doornich et al., 2019; Goretzki et al., 
2018) depart from an assumption that individuals (or teams) have a desire to self-manage and 
be autonomous. Adler and Borys (1996) point to how the enabling logic has more positive 
connotations in the literature. Further, they caution against discussing bureaucratic forms only 
in their flawed variants, acknowledging that there may also be benefits to the more coercive 
logic. Therefore, this paper sets out to critically investigate the assumptions of a BB-inspired 
self-management initiative as unequivocally constructive. 
While extant research primarily focuses on the managerial level, few have studied the 
consequences of MC changes at the operational level. Merchant and Otley (2020) express 
concern regarding accounting research and its connection to practice and call for research on 
the practical concerns of managers, employees, and systems designers. Specifically, they 




p. 4), rather than the construction of optimal MCS, is a promising avenue for research. Other 
researchers (Matějka et al., 2020) call for more research on the differences in beliefs regarding 
transparency of information and self-regulation in BB organizations. 
In our case study, we examine an organization that seeks to design a performance 
measurement system that builds on the Beyond Budgeting philosophy and self-management 
logics. Specifically, we investigate a financial institution that introduced self-management 
principles to its performance measurement system at an employee level. We investigate the 
concerns of how self-management is operationalized, and what consequences this has for the 
design and use of control elements that are intended to be enabling. The principal research 
question we seek to answer is how managers and employees make sense of control elements 
with enabling design characteristics. By doing so, we elaborate on the tension between enabling 
and coercive control, as well as its relationship to self-management on middle-manager and 
employee levels. 
Our research provides evidence of situations in which the proposed decentralization of 
responsibility and empowerment of employees is rejected, as some employees are indeed 
satisfied with stricter and less flexible boundary conditions. Not all employees (even though 
they qualify as knowledge workers) have a desire to become (self-)leaders of any sort, and 
many express that self-management requires more work. Rather, the employees in our study 
find safety and clarity in knowing ex-ante what is expected of them, with the added benefit of 
relying on others (i.e., managers) for improvement work and strategic thinking. 
We contribute to the debate on enabling controls (e.g., Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; 
Cuganesan & Free, 2020; Jordan & Messner, 2012; O’Grady, 2019; Wouters & Wilderom, 





Further, we demonstrate how insights from the organization literature may inform 
management accounting. To our knowledge, Van der Kolk et al. (2020) is the only other 
empirical control paper studying the operationalization of self-management and control. 
Similar to previous studies of self-managed teams (e.g., Barker, 1993), we find that individual 
self-management enterprises may lead to feelings of tighter control and less flexibility in task 
execution. For instance, Wouters and Wilderom (2008) conclude that transparency is crucial to 
the success of enabling performance measurement systems. Yet, we find that transparency can 
constrain employees, as ubiquitous performance information increases peer pressure. Thus, 
employees no longer feel they have discretion over work processes, but rather converge towards 
the rest of the organization. 
Stewart et al. (2011) concluded that self-leadership is not a substitute for external 
leadership, without actually unpacking the role of management and control in self-managing 
contexts. We find that middle managers maintained an important position in the self-managed 
context, albeit in a redefined role as coaches and motivators for the financial advisors, 
accentuating the seemingly oxymoronic need for management in self-management. These 
findings help us understand the importance of having skillful middle managers (Doornich et 
al., 2019) as translators of enabling formalizations, even in decentralized contexts. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline the 
theoretical framework within which we position this study before we summarize our 
methodological choices in the third section. In the fourth section, we present our empirical 
work, before we discuss our findings and conclude in the final section. 
2. Theoretical Development 
In this paper, we draw on management control (MC) literature in general, literature on enabling 




use of enabling management control systems. First, we present some of the most salient tensions 
within the concept of management control. Second, we show how the discourse around enabling 
and coercive control has become normative to some extent and semi-functionalistic in the sense 
that enabling control systems can be designed. Finally, we introduce literature on self-
management from the field of organizational psychology before we briefly sum up some of the 
most pertinent concepts for further empirical investigation. 
2.1. Tensions in Management Control 
Accounting scholars have discussed control and inherent tensions in the control concept for 
more than half a century. Anthony (1965) debated cybernetic controls versus management by 
exception, Hopwood (1972) argued for a tension between rigid and flexible controls, Simons 
(1995) explored the duality in diagnostic and interactive controls, Merchant (1985) and Van 
der Stede (2001) consider tight versus loose control, and some accounting scholars (e.g., Ahrens 
& Chapman, 2004; Jordan & Messner, 2012; Jørgensen & Messner, 2009) have discussed 
coercive versus enabling management control. The dynamic tensions in MCS (Henri, 2006) 
include tensions between control and autonomy (Kaarbøe et al., 2013) and the balancing of 
firmness and flexibility (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008). 
Contemporary management accounting research seeks to develop the concepts of 
control and MCS (Berry et al., 2009; Chenhall, 2003). Employee empowerment (Chenhall & 
Langfield-Smith, 1998), organizational learning (Jönsson, 1992), and flexibility (Mouritsen, 
1999) are some of the notions introduced as challenges to traditional control. Malmi and Brown 
(2008) discuss how contemporary management control practice is indeed a practice in which 
several management control systems (MCS) operate simultaneously rather than in isolation, 




It is argued that modern control systems are challenged by the demand for autonomy in 
increasingly more dynamic business environments (Kaarbøe et al., 2013). Central to discourses 
concerned with the management and controlling of organizational performance are notions of 
empowerment, autonomy, flexibility, and self-management. For example, it is anticipated that 
autonomy, rather than regulation, is important for motivational purposes (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
Accordingly, it might be useful to conceptualize dynamic MCS as structures that facilitate the 
employees’ need for autonomy and self-determination. The facilitation of autonomy and self-
management is contrasted by the traditionally top-down driven processes with fixed direction 
and constraints. 
Merchant (1985) and Van der Stede (2001) discuss how control can be conceived as 
either tight or loose. The discourse builds on agency theory, and tight control is an agency 
mechanism reducing the agent’s discretion over actions, thus reducing the associated agency 
costs and potentially harmful consequences of information asymmetry. Van der Stede (2001, 
p. 124) argues that tight budgetary control is held to exist if top management “Puts much 
emphasis on meeting the budget; Does not easily accept budget revisions during the year; Has 
a detailed interest in specific budget line-items; Does not lightly tolerate deviations from interim 
budget targets; and, Is intensively engaged in budget-related communications”. Others argue 
that tight versus loose internal control is a dimension that deals with the degree of formality 
and punctuality within an organization (Hofstede, 1989). 
The opposing roles of how MC facilitates decentralization and autonomy, either as 
constraints or enablers, have reemerged in the management accounting literature with examples 
such as mechanistic versus organic controls (Chenhall & Morris, 1995), formal versus informal 
controls (Chenhall, 2003), or diagnostic versus interactive controls (Simons, 1995). Prior 
research has typically focused on the contradictive purposes of MC as mutually excluding, 




emphasizing flexibility and learning (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). Yet, as practice consists of 
“overlapping approaches to management control” (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004, p. 277), a 
complex and dynamic relationship between different types of controls is implied, suggesting 
possibilities of coexistence or complementary interrelation between these. The complicated 
marriage between control and autonomy is therefore a recurring theme in the literature, and the 
contradictive alliance is filled with tensions and complexities that are not easily solved (Argyris, 
1998). 
2.2. Enabling and Coercive Controls in the Accounting Literature 
Building on Adler and Borys’ (1996) seminal work on formal controls and bureaucratization, 
accounting scholars have embraced the concept of enabling controls as a lens through which 
the simultaneous use of mechanistic elements and organic patterns can be studied (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2004; Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Cuganesan & Free, 2020; Doornich et al., 2019; Free, 
2007; Henttu-Aho, 2016; Jordan & Messner, 2012; Jørgensen & Messner, 2009; O’Grady, 
2019; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). 
Adler and Borys (1996) discussed how coercive formalizations arise when procedures 
are seen as a substitute for, rather than a complement to, commitment. They further postulated 
that formalization could lead to non-committed and dissatisfied employees, effectively limiting 
innovation. The enabling formalization is presented as procedures that provide organizational 
memory based on learning from experience. The formal structure enables the organization to 
codify best-practice routines and dispense new organizational capabilities. Adler and Borys 
(1996) advance to present a typology of organizations as either organic or autocratic (low 
formalization), otherwise enabling or mechanistic (high formalization). The authors 
acknowledge that the dichotomous typology is a simplified representation of continuous 




versus mechanistic and bureaucratic organizations, essentially showing that bureaucracy does 
not necessarily equal mechanistic structures, depending on the degree and type of formalization. 
Ahrens and Chapman (2004, p. 271) build on the framework developed by Adler and 
Borys, and describe the coercive use of control elements as the “stereotypical top-down control 
approach that emphasizes centralization and preplanning”. Conversely, enabling the use of 
management control “seeks to put employees in a position to deal directly with the inevitable 
contingencies in their work” (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004, p. 271). Chapman and Kihn (2009, p. 
152) argue that enabling control works “with rather than replaces user’s intelligence and 
experience”. The conceptualization of enabling control thus implies that enabling is good and 
coercive is bad (Burney et al., 2017). Henttu-Aho (2016) finds that enabling control works in 
settings where controllers’ mindsets and competences are aligned with the system in a 
decentralized organization. 
Moreover, some authors take a fairly normative approach regarding the design of 
control elements, in which enabling formalization “specifies the features that formal systems 
should possess if they are to foster both efficiency and flexibility” (Jørgensen & Messner, 2009, 
p. 100). Other studies see enabling control and PMS as something that is possible to develop 
and implement (Englund & Gerdin, 2015; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). We question the 
direction of this research, where the analysis of coercive PMS has gone missing from the 
discourse and been marginalized to something undesirable and outdated. 
In their effort to make available conceptual clarity, Bisbe et al. (2019, p. 129) argue that 
the pursuit of “fool proof systems” belongs to coercive formalizations and that enabling 
formalizations are designed to help employees deal with contingencies in their work. Wouters 
and Wilderom (2008), as well as Jordan and Messner (2012) address this in their study of 
incomplete performance measures. Because accounting information is rarely a perfect 




the incompleteness problem (Jordan & Messner, 2012). The literature on coercive and enabling 
controls appears to be consistent about how the distinction between the two types is design-
driven (Bisbe et al., 2019). Still, most of the papers center around the perception of such control 
elements at the managerial level, ignoring the lower levels in organizations. 
One notable exception to the lack of focus on coercive systems is the recent paper by 
O’Grady (2019) in which she studies the role of coercive controls in highly decentralized 
settings. However, the study focuses on managers and their ability to deal with contingencies 
and not particularly on the consequence for employees without managerial responsibilities. 
Cuganesan and Free (2020) study employees at an operational level and find that control 
elements may be perceived as both enabling and coercive and that perceptions over time moved 
towards coercive. Several studies have investigated the perspective from top and middle 
management (e.g., Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Jørgensen & Messner, 2009), but Cuganesan and 
Free (2020) appear to be the only exception studying the perception of enabling and coercive 
control at an operational level. 
Doornich et al. (2019) show how tensions between intention and attention are moderated 
by skillful middle managers, based on the coercive and enabling orientations of formal rules. 
This links to the notion of utilizing expertise and decentralizing the control of activities in the 
self-management literature as we discuss in the next section. 
2.3. Self-Management 
Understanding the theoretical underpinnings of self-management is imperative to empirically 
study a self-management project. The literature on self-management is well established in 
psychology and organization research, but its connectedness to management control is elusive. 
Van der Kolk et al. (2020) study self-management as an organizational value which in itself 




and systems, we turn to organizational psychology literature to better understand how self-
management affects the individual. Apart from Van der Kolk et al. (2020), self-management is 
rarely explicitly mentioned in management accounting research. We attempt to bridge the gap 
between management accounting research and the organizational psychology literature by 
merging the two areas before illustrating the processes of operationalizing self-management in 
our empirical section. 
In the organization literature, managerial control is considered to constitute the 
boundaries of employee tasks (Slocum & Sims, 1980), without delving deeper into the 
behavioral consequences of such structures. This section provides an overview of extant 
research on self-management and culminates in a brief summary of similarities between the 
enabling control literature and the self-management literature. 
For decades, researchers have studied self-management on both individual and 
group/team levels (e.g., Barker, 1993; Hackman, 1986; Manz & Sims, 1980; P. K. Mills, 1983; 
Stewart et al., 2011). Self-management, self-control, self-regulation, and, more recently, self-
leadership have been used more or less interchangeably. Stewart and colleagues (2011) show 
how these concepts are not discrete constructs, but rather fall along a continuum from externally 
managed individuals/teams, solely dependent on extrinsic incentives with no influence over the 
What, How and Why of work, to self-led individuals/teams, dependent on both extrinsic as well 
as intrinsic incentives with complete influence over the What, How and Why of work. 
Throughout this paper, we primarily use the term self-management about individuals that are 
operating in an environment beyond external control. 
Hackman (1986) distinguishes between manager-led units, self-managing units, self-
designing units, and self-governing units where the responsibility of management decreases 
proportionately to the increasing responsibility of the performing unit when moving from 




execution, the performing unit gradually assumes previous management responsibilities such 
as the monitoring and management of work processes, the design of the performing unit and its 
context, and finally, in a self-governing unit, setting the overall direction for the individual, 
team or organization. 
According to Hackman (1986, pp. 93–97), there are five behavioral signs of self-
management; 
(1) People take personal responsibility for the outcomes of their work and show in their 
behavior that they feel personally accountable for the results of what they do; 
(2) People monitor their own performance continuously, actively seeking data and 
feedback to learn how well they are accomplishing their tasks; 
(3) People manage their own performance, taking corrective action at their own initiative 
to improve their performance; 
(4) [People] actively seek from the organization the guidance, help, or resources they 
need for excellent performance; and, 
(5) People take initiatives to help people in other areas improve their performance. 
Early research on the subject of self-management subscribed to a definition of self-control as 
offered by clinical psychologists Thoresen and Mahoney (1974, p. 12): “A person displays self-
control when in the relative absence of immediate external constraints, he engages in behavior 
whose previous probability has been less than that of alternatively available behaviors”. In other 
words, willingly choosing to engage in activities that are not the most desirable alternative, 
even though there is no one or nothing to obstruct the individual from engaging in more self-
indulgent activities. By freely choosing to do what is in the organization’s (principal) best 
interest, an individual (agent) exhibiting self-control thus reduces the cost of agency problems, 
such as alignment of interests. 
Through an extensive literature review of self-management studies, Stewart et al. (2011) 
list several outcomes of self-leadership behavior. Some of the findings are contradictory, and 




certain postulated outcomes of self-management, such as increases in career success; 
productivity/quality; creativity; self-efficacy; psychological empowerment; job satisfaction; 
and organizational commitment, as well as decreases in absenteeism; turnover; and 
stress/anxiety (Stewart et al., 2011, p. 194). 
Manz and Sims (1980) argue that self-management may reduce the need for close 
supervision, and that self-management might be seen as a substitute for leadership. The tensions 
lie in how to ensure commitment, and solutions proposed range from employee stock ownership 
to job satisfaction and everything in between. Research on intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation 
(e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000) is merely one of the large research streams that might be used to 
explain how employees sense psychological ownership and become committed to the 
organization. What is central within these fields of research is the notion of control as defined 
by internal regulators (Deci et al., 1989; P. K. Mills, 1983; Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
Kirkman and Rosen (1999) argue that self-management is only analogous to one of four 
empowerment dimensions; autonomy, and further argue that team empowerment is a much 
wider concept than self-management. Nevertheless, freedom and autonomy are undeniably 
central in self-management discourse, and autonomy is seen as a prerequisite for intrinsic 
motivation in self-determination theory (SDT) (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Intrinsically motivated 
individuals and teams have a stronger organizational commitment, which in turn is argued to 
be positively correlated with performance (Han et al., 2010). 
Further, self-management is advocated to facilitate organizational performance in 
numerous ways. For instance, Kirkman and Rosen (1999) show that productivity, 
proactiveness, customer service, job satisfaction, as well as commitment are positively 
correlated to the level of team empowerment, whereas Cordery et al. (1991) illustrate how 
organizational commitment is stronger for autonomous employees than it is for employees 




psychological ownership is shown to be positively correlated with organizational commitment 
and therefore performance (Han et al., 2010; O’Driscoll et al., 2006; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). 
Thus, an individual’s commitment to an organization functions as a psychological contract 
wherein the agent’s behavior is better aligned with the principal’s interests, even though no 
formal rules specify which activities the individual/team should engage in (see Thoresen & 
Mahoney, 1974 on self-control). 
As shown, the underlying premise for studying self-management draws upon research 
from a variety of fields. Autonomy and freedom are important parts of empowering individuals 
or teams, whereas the empowerment of employees through delegation of decision-authority is 
essential to ensure organizational commitment and internally motivated employees (Conger & 
Kanungo, 1988; Seibert et al., 2004). Internally motivated and committed employees change 
jobs less frequently, are more creative and productive, ultimately leading to performance gains 
for the organization (Kirkman & Rosen, 1999). The proposed benefits of self-management, 
such as productivity improvements and decreased agency problems make the subject an 
attractive leadership philosophy. 
Hackman (1986) identifies three features of the organizational context significant in the 
support of self-managing individuals and units; (1) The reward system, (2) The education 
system, and (3) The information system. Seeing how strategies for successful self-management 
include standard-setting (self-goal setting), performance evaluation (self-evaluation; self-
observation), and initiating corrective measures (self-regulation; self-reward; self-criticism), as 
well as rehearsals to improve individual or unit capabilities (Manz & Sims, 1980; Stewart et 
al., 2011), accounting (i.e., control elements) can be seen as instrumental support (or context) 
facilitating self-management in organizations by providing memory about obligations and 
performance (Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). Hackman’s (1986) 




accounting research, as he describes it as critical to a unit’s ability to “plan and execute a task-
appropriate performance strategy” (Hackman, 1986, p. 113). The information system should 
provide clear information about the performance situation, including task requirements, 
resource availability, and resource allocations. 
The organizing of self-managed individuals, performance information, and control 
elements is not addressed explicitly in the organizational literature. Therefore, this study 
attempts to shed light on the sensemaking processes of self-management, radical 
decentralization, and control. 
2.4. Theoretical Framework 
Drawing on extant literature on enabling control and self-management, we develop a theoretical 
framework to investigate how different actors at different levels in an organization make sense 
of intended enabling design characteristics. 
As demonstrated in the previous section, extant self-management literature adds nuance 
to the enabling control literature as it emphasizes the role of the individual in engendering good 
performance. The organization literature treats control systems as context and exogenous to 
middle managers and employees, whereas the management control literature allows us to 
integrate this context into the study of self-managed individuals to elaborate on the relationship 
between context and behavior. Empowerment is an important concept for self-management, and 
it links to autonomy and the design characteristics of for instance BB-inspired MCS. 
Correspondingly, the enabling logic associated with repair represents the empowerment 
of organizational actors to suggest or execute workarounds that deal with contingencies in their 
work (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). Flexibility is considered to be a central feature of enabling 
systems (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). O’Grady (2019) equates flexibility with autonomy, while 




observations of dynamism and agility within BB (Bogsnes, 2009). Adler and Borys (1996) 
describe transparency in enabling procedures as access to information about the inner workings 
of processes across multiple levels, which made us want to study the construction of meaning 
across different levels in a self-managed organization. In coercive logic, information 
asymmetry benefits managers over employees, but transparency breaks down these processes 
and diffuse understanding and best practice routines (Adler & Borys, 1996; Jørgensen & 
Messner, 2009; O’Grady, 2019). 
Sensemaking is about how actors make sense of and rationalize situations, contexts, and 
environments within which they are embedded (Weick et al., 2005). Accounting studies have 
shown the role of sensemaking for coordination and planning (Goretzki & Messner, 2016) and 
how sensemaking, through sensegiving activities, may be guided and restricted (Kraus & 
Strömsten, 2012). Cuganesan and Free (2020) use sensemaking to study the perceptions of new 
controls in police squads. In our study, we use sensemaking as a theoretical lens to investigate 
how organizational actors construct meaning about a novel system based on self-management 
as a control element. According to Mills et al. (2010), sensemaking is an analytical tool that 
can be used to understand such organizational events. 
As presented in sections 2.1 to 2.3, the theoretical foundation of this study is based on 
extant knowledge from primarily two areas: the accounting literature on enabling controls; and 
the organization literature on self-management. It may be difficult to see the immediate 
relevance of self-management to management control, but Slocum and Sims (1980) point to 
how managerial control is present in self-management, and that it tends to be focused on the 
boundaries of employee tasks and the outputs of employee activities. This is very much in line 
with what happens in BB organizations, and the shift from input to output controls is an 
important part of this. In the developmental mode, employees have discretion over task 




(i.e., central/top management, local/middle management, and employees) make sense of these 
activities differently. We narrow down our scope to study the sensemaking processes 
concerning three interrelated concepts from the previous sections, namely empowerment, 
flexibility, and transparency. It remains unclear whether enabling controls are a prerequisite for 
self-management, or if they are a consequence of autonomous and self-managed employees. It 
is also unclear whether a coercive MCS is incompatible with freedom. In our study, the case 
organization adopts a performance measurement system that explicitly claims to enable 
operational staff to self-manage and self-evaluate. 
To sum up, we present the theoretical framework within which we demonstrate how 
managers and employees make sense of empowerment, flexibility, and transparency as design 
features of a control system, by presenting the intention, perception, and use, as well as the 
unintended consequences of such design choices. 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
3. Methodological Choices 
The case company was selected because it offered a unique opportunity to study the integration 




context. The case explores how self-management is designed, implemented, and used as part 
of management control in practice. An ethnographic research method is chosen to grasp the 
complexities of the dynamic nature of PMS in practice (Ahrens & Chapman, 2007), including 
all relations, actions, strategies, and processes involved. In this regard, the vision of the studies 
of the practical character of accounting is to understand the specific contingencies in the minds 
of the organizational members. In our paper, we strive to provide deep interpretations of 
organizational practice, as well as the meanings that are ascribed to and drawn from them. 
Consistent with Hopwood (1989), this research aims to convey the practical 
understanding played out by the organizational members’ use and interpretation of the PMS. 
Thus, the research is designed to follow a flexible approach to capture the specific relationships, 
controversies, linkages, and relationships made in practice when self-management is 
implemented. However, even in an ethnographic study, the researcher cannot be present at all 
times, and there is always uncertainty regarding whether it was the most crucial trajectories that 
were observed and followed (Law, 1994; Mouritsen, 1999). To reduce this uncertainty, a 
triangular research method was used (Berg & Lune, 2012). Interviews and other documentation 
(such as PowerPoints, Excel spreadsheets, and reports) are used in addition to observations and 
interviews. These additional data sources are valuable pieces of information regarding the past 
and present states of affairs in the organization. 
The researcher responsible for data collection in the case organization visited the 
company over two years. The visits lasted between two days and two weeks each time. In total, 
55 interviews were conducted, together with participation in numerous formal and informal 
meetings at different levels in the organization. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
The interviewees are chosen based on their link to the control elements, ranging from corporate 
management to operational employees. Altogether, we have 16 interviews with top 




management is managers at corporate headquarters (central management), while middle 
management is regional/branch managers in three different branches. The employees are all 
financial advisors from the three branches. 
Field notes, personal reflections, and theoretical notes were recorded during the visits 
to the company. After each visit, further reflections were chronicled, as were observational and 
theoretical notes. The observational notes describe verbal exchanges such as conversations, 
jokes, and comments between the employees, as well as between the employees and the 
researcher. Observed practices, such as routines, activities, and interactions are also recorded 
in the observational notes. Lastly, the researcher kept a record of method notes, a log of what 
type of questions or behavior that worked or did not work during interviews so that adjustments 
could be made for the next visit. The interviews were semi-structured and started with a broad 
focus. As the researcher became more familiar with the company, the performance 
measurement system, and internal processes, the focus of the questions was adjusted towards 
these emerging themes. 
 




In the next section we describe aspects of the case company, with a particular focus on the 
intentions and design choices made in the attempt to facilitate self-management in the 
organization. The empirical description is the preliminary finding from the case study, and the 
aim is to outline the relationship between self-management and contemporary MC. 
4. Case Study Findings 
To start, a short empirical background of the organization is presented, before delving deeper 
into the control elements and their consequences for top- and middle-management, as well as 
for employees. First, we introduce the case company, before we focus on some of the design 
features and the intentions of top management at the outset of introducing self-management. 
Then, we illustrate how managers and employees make sense of these design choices in 
practice, as they constitute a collective sensemaking process about manifestations of 
decentralization and autonomy, as well as assumptions about causal relationships between 
intention, perception and use, and unintended consequences. 
4.1. Empirical Background and Context 
The Self-Management Finance Cooperation (SMFC) is an alliance of large regional savings 
banks in Norway. At the start of 2012, the financial alliance had 17 member banks. The SMFC 
is one of the biggest providers of financial services in Norway. The alliance cooperates on 
banking services and products to strengthen the competitive advantages, profitability, and 
solvency by providing economies of scale to the member banks. The SMFC is a cooperation 
that ensures more cost-effective means for the member banks to provide the customers with 
high-quality products, efficient IT services, sourcing arrangements, and knowledge sharing. In 
recent years, SMFC and its largest members implemented Beyond Budgeting (BB) as a 




various changes and restructuring of member organizations, where re-conceptualizing 
performance measurement is one of the central changes. This case study is conducted in one of 
the largest member banks in SMFC, namely BB Finance. 
BB Finance is a savings bank, situated in the eastern part of Norway. The bank employs 
approximately 800 people. Savings banks have traditionally held a strong position in the local 
market, and BB Finance enjoys a strong position in the local community. As the director of 
personal markets stated, BB Finance “knows its customers, and the customers know their 
bank”. With a 170-year history in its local market, BB Finance enjoys more than a 50 % market 
share in its region with the slogan “Together in creating”. The bank consists of several branches. 
Each branch has a branch manager, and the branches are distributed among five regional 
managers. The branch managers report to the regional managers, who again report to the 
divisional director. The main employee group in the branches is the financial advisors (FA) for 
both private and business customers. 
4.2. Designing an Enabling Performance Measurement System 
In this section, the case findings related to the new PMS and top management’s intentions with 
the initiative are presented. In BB Finance, self-management is introduced and implemented 
with the help of external business consultants, and some of the material in this section comes 
from presentations made available to us by the bank and an external consultancy firm involved 
in the design and implementation process. The interviews reveal that management perceives 
the earlier structure in BB Finance as a leadership and control style that was considered 
inflexible and coercive. Control elements such as budgets, KPIs, employee measures, market 
share measures, and customer satisfaction measures have been employed through top-down 




PERFORM – The PMS of BB Finance 
Top management wishes to change the management and control style, by introducing a new 
PMS (called PERFORM) aimed at empowering employees and increasing efficiency through 
self-management. With empowered employees, management expects employees to take control 
of their own tasks, target setting, and performance evaluation, rather than leaving it to 
management. Employees are supported in doing so, by the means of the updated PMS, where 
comprehensive performance measures and feedback loops are thought to provide employees 
with the necessary knowledge to self-evaluate and regulate behavior. Thus, employees are 
expected to become self-managed. Internal documents show how the goal of PERFORM is to 
reduce variance in performance between “the best and the rest.” Accordingly, the intention of 
the PMS redesign is to provide a system within which employees can set goals and evaluate 
performance. 
In BB Finance, self-management is understood as self-controlled and committed 
employees who take control of their own performance and necessary regulation of action to 
achieve their performance goals (from interview with the Director of PM and interview with 
the Internal Consultant facilitating the initiative). The performance measurement system has a 
central role in facilitating and developing the self-managed employee, and one of the managers 
argues that PERFORM is different from their traditional conception of control: 
Our idea with PERFORM is to design something else than a control system, this is a 
development system. We have discussed a lot how to support everyone to become as good 
as they can be so that everyone realizes their full performance potential. (Chief Controller) 
Management talks about the PMS as a regime designed to enable individuals to perform their 
best through self-management, and that it is about enabling performance rather than controlling 
it. The delivery of performance feedback is supposed to shift responsibility for motivation from 




We believe that this regime [i.e., sharing best practice and other performance data for 
employees to self-manage], to put it like that, that it is this regime that enables the 
individual to realize their full performance potential. And we cannot expect or ask for more 
than that, so PERFORM is about enabling performance, not to control it. (Chief Controller) 
 
I am a firm believer in self-management because we are a knowledge organization 
employing highly educated and high performing people. When financial advisors realize 
what this system can give them in terms of producing relevant feedback to their task 
performance, it will produce new confidence in their own customer processes. And I think 
this will produce an internal drive which I feel we have been missing. Because it has been 
the managers’ job to motivate you, and the managers’ job to hold you accountable for 
figures and performance outcomes, but now that the control is placed with the financial 
advisors, we get an internal drive. (Director, C&M) 
Even though management talks about enabling and supporting employees in their self-
management efforts, the PMS is also referred to as a “regime” that dictates how individual 
advisors should respond to performance feedback from the system. 
BB Finance refers to its IT system as a self-manager – a system that provides financial 
advisors with (allegedly) unbiased performance feedback which the individuals can interpret 
and manage themselves: 
Therefore, PERFORM is a system to organize self-management. You receive a 
performance evaluation [from the IT system], maybe that you need to improve some areas 
of your performance, and then you reflect on the signal that you received before you need 
to think of corrective actions. (Director, C&M) 
Arguably, at the onset, self-management in BB Finance is understood as the outcome of various 
external control mechanisms, carefully designed with the employee as the main controller of 
evaluation and direction-setter for own behavior. These design characteristics are meant to 
facilitate empowerment, flexibility, and transparency, among others. 
As BB Finance wants to ensure a certain minimum level of performance from all 




performance floors for all employees. These threshold targets define the lower boundaries 
within which empowered financial analysts can operate and also constitute a downward limit 
for flexibility: 
The threshold targets define some leading structures to allow a more proactive approach 
towards the customers. (Internal Consultant) 
These performance floors are a way of managing downside risks in a setting with few formal 
control mechanisms (from interview with Head of Risk Management). As we show in the next 
sections, these targets are perceived as unreasonable; discouraging collaboration, as well as 
deterring flexibility in dealing with unforeseen incidents. 
The interviews also reveal that this restructuring of responsibilities from branch 
management to the individual financial advisor was fraught with challenges, and the 
redistribution of responsibility requires a new understanding of the role and purpose of the 
branch manager. The manager does not facilitate top-down control, but rather supports 
employee initiatives, development, and goal achievement. The manager is understood as a 
coach and a facilitator of the self-management principles in the new PMS, and the following 
sections reveal how organizational actors in BB Finance make sense of these changes. 
4.3. Making Sense of Empowerment 
This segment highlights our findings related to empowerment as a design characteristic. One 
of the explicit goals of this change initiative (and an integral part of BB) is to empower 
employees, to allow financial advisors to repair flaws in the system and manage themselves 
towards better performance. In this section, we start with a short introduction to the intention 
of facilitating empowerment before we show how managers and employees make sense of 
empowerment in practice. We focus on the discrepancies between intention and use that bring 




One of the prime actors in initiating and implementing the PERFORM project is an 
internal consultant. Here, they explain how empowerment to control work processes is central 
to achieve higher efficiency: 
The most important purpose with PERFORM is higher efficiency than before. To produce 
higher efficiency, you need to take control of your work process, which is at the core of 
self-management. (Internal Consultant) 
For the empowered financial advisor, the performance measurement system in BB Finance 
entails more work, and this facilitates and inspires financial advisors to become more selfish 
and cooperate less, even when it is potentially harmful on an aggregate level. Collaboration 
between colleagues is perceived as less prominent now than before. As one financial advisor 
puts it: 
I am much more focused on myself [with the new system in place]. […] I guess that some 
of the change in cooperation is also due to the increased workload. We simply do not have 
as much time for discussion among one another anymore. (Financial Advisor, Branch Z) 
Distributing responsibility to individual financial advisors leads to an increased workload, 
stifles collaboration, and stimulates egocentrism. A financial advisor in a different branch is of 
the same perception, and points to how the system itself counteracts collaboration and dialogue 
between individuals with diverging competences: 
It is problematic that the ranking functions in a way so that we do not sufficiently draw on 
each other’s competences. It would make a lot more sense if one that is good at savings 
and one that is good at financing work together, rather than both spending a lot of time 
trying to be best at both individually. This is what the system does. (Financial Advisor, 
Branch X) 
Yet another financial advisor expresses their frustration with reduced opportunities to 




cannot take place: 
We often experience cases that are important to discuss. If there are difficult issues, it is 
important that we dare to talk about them, to discuss them, and to admit that you cannot 
always do everything by yourself. (Financial Advisor, Branch Z) 
The threshold targets (TTs) established by BB Finance are supposed to safeguard against very 
low performance, but even middle management finds that these are inflexible, 
counterproductive, and obstruct cooperation: 
Yes, but that [TTs] is only a target on activity level, which is complete nonsense. I mean, 
look at [financial advisor]. She spent nine days at another branch to help them out, which 
now leaves her Friday to complete five customer meetings. (Branch Manager, Branch Y) 
With a threshold of at least five customer meetings, the financial advisor is being “punished” 
for helping out a colleague, leaving only one day to “check another box” in the PMS. Financial 
advisors find threshold targets unfair due to the complexity of their work and the heterogeneous 
composition of their customer bases. Variable target achievement for thresholds is rationalized 
and questioned: 
The variance could be due to many things. It could reflect my lack of competence, or it 
could be due to the composition of my customer portfolio. For example, my customer 
composition means customers with large loans. (Financial Advisor, Branch X) 
The increased workload that comes from managing themselves (i.e., empowerment) results in 
financial advisors perceiving this as having less time for collective problem solving and 
collaboration with colleagues. Unintentionally, the empowerment of employees thus promotes 





4.4. Making Sense of Flexibility 
In this section, we present our findings concerning the use and perception of intended flexible 
control elements. Designing a PMS for self-management was supposed to provide the 
employees with timely, relevant, and precise performance feedback which would provide 
financial advisors with freedom regarding how to execute their tasks. Through flexibility, 
employees can deal with contingencies in their work swiftly, and there is an assumption that 
this decentralized flexibility improves efficiency and quality (from internal presentation). When 
designing the system, BB Finance intended to set up a system that provides performance signals 
that are supposed to support financial advisors in becoming better versions of themselves, 
through acting on such signals in the ways they find useful. However, managers and employees 
perceive and use the system in an inflexible manner. In BB Finance’s effort to standardize and 
structure the boundaries of control elements in the system, flexibility is hampered. 
Initially, the defining of boundaries in the system (specifically the threshold targets) is 
perceived as coercive and inflexible, demonstrating that BB Finance is not truly successful in 
designing flexibility. One advisor describes how the system does not adapt to individual 
differences in ways of working: 
I do use the self-manager [PERFORM], but this is where they [management] fail to sell the 
idea to us. Because self-management is not about everyone using the system in the same 
way. Because we are not the same. So, self-management means that it is the system that 
must be adapted to the individuals’ ways of working. Some of us work with a lot of 
structure and plans, and others are more flexible and impulsive. Self-management should 
mean that there is room for working in different ways and still deliver results. (Financial 
Advisor, Branch X) 
Whether it is the system that is innately inflexible, the advisors’ lack of ability to utilize the 
flexible characteristics of the system, or management’s unsuccessful communication of the 




is a combination of factors. Financial advisors find it difficult to see how the control elements 
provide them with a full and credible picture of their true performance. The system does not 
take into account the different competences and areas of expertise of individual advisors, which 
leads advisors to think that the system is flawed and rigid: 
It’s difficult to get the complete picture in PERFORM. If I have worked with insurance for 
10 years and spend 90 % of my time on insurance, I will achieve great results on this 
dimension but poor results on financing or saving. (Financial Advisor, Branch Y) 
The perceived value of the new self-management elements is limited by the inflexibility of the 
rules and routines defined within the system. This inflexibility impedes the financial advisors’ 
ability to self-manage, and the system does not allow employees to adjust what feedback they 
receive (i.e., repair), based on personal needs and preferences. When investigating this further, 
the lack of flexibility appears to be a feature of the system, not a flaw. The corporate controller 
explains: 
There are defined boundaries assigned to your job. As a financial advisor, it cannot be as 
easy as just choosing a target of your own liking. We are talking about self-management 
within clearly defined boundaries. There are certain defined expectations, and within these 
expectations, you are responsible for the self-evaluation of your own performance. (Chief 
Controller) 
In addition to the highly restricted flexibility, absolute threshold targets are perceived to be 
unfair for advisors with fewer but larger customers and focusing on activity without measuring 
return is perceived to be inadequate. This illustrates how both managers and employees fail to 
flexibly mobilize the control elements of the new PMS. Either, because the individuals lack 
motivation, creativity, or competence for modifying the controls, or because top management 
has failed to design a truly flexible system. Instead of becoming dynamic support for managers 





In PERFORM it is enough to only hold the meeting. And the customer might find the 
meeting nice, without considering buying a product. (Branch Manager, Branch Y) 
Corporate management acknowledges that absolute targets, for instance around customer 
meetings, are problematic as they promote standards over individual competences. 
I mean, it’s impossible to standardize a customer meeting. The meeting is about 
competences, not standards. (Director of Performance Management) 
In an attempt to repair the problem with absolute threshold targets and deal with the perceived 
inflexibility, BB Finance softens their approach and redefines this control element as dynamic 
threshold targets. The redesign is marginal, and the main difference is that these thresholds are 
now guidelines rather than absolute requirements. The previous performance floor remains as 
an anchor, but employees are given an opportunity to adjust in accordance with advisor 
competences, customer composition, and customer needs: 
Well, you can say that this is a basic standard of five in-depth meetings and ten phone calls, 
and then the financial advisors can define their own standards of what they expect to 
achieve the coming week. This will vary individually. (Regional Manager, A) 
The marginal improvement in flexibility is illustrated when we ask whether a change in target 
setting can be demonstrated post-change and whether it is possible to set targets below the 
previous performance floor. One manager’s reply sums it up well: 
They [financial advisors] do set their own targets. You still have the standard, which is five 
customer meetings and ten outgoing phone calls, but then the financial advisors set targets 
corresponding to what they think they will achieve next week. And that may vary. They 
can set targets below standards, and that is adjusted to various things. For instance, if they 
work three days that week, then the target is easier. (Branch Manager, Branch Z) 
As this manager’s statement expresses, the threshold targets are made somewhat more flexible, 





The way managers and employees make sense of flexibility in BB Finance is that 
flexibility to individually adjust the control elements is hampered by the constraints that were 
put in place as a risk management effort. The presence of threshold targets undermines trust in 
individuals and has consequences for the work environment and collaboration: 
I think that the foundation for succeeding with sales over time is trust, and a positive work 
environment where everyone wishes to see everyone else succeed. Where one protects and 
appreciates the value of teamwork and cooperation, and this is not what is promoted in 
PERFORM. (Branch Manager, Branch Y) 
The issues of trust and reduced cooperation resurface when exploring the sensemaking 
processes related to transparency as a design feature and control element. 
4.5. Making Sense of Transparency 
This part presents the findings related to transparency as a control element. Transparency as a 
design characteristic promotes codifying and sharing best practice. BB Finance wants to share 
best practice across branches and between individuals to inspire learning and growth. This 
sharing is done through benchmarking across individuals by sharing relative performance 
targets and disseminating best practice examples from high performers. 
Management in BB Finance has also thought about the level of transparency within the 
system and chose to go with a semi-transparent design. The design allows individuals to see 
their ranking in the organization, without seeing the names of their peers, and this is a conscious 
design choice to thwart competition and individualism. However, management maintains that 
competition can be healthy and that high-performing individuals should be allowed to know 




You do see how you are ranked relative to the others in the bank, but you cannot see the 
name of the others. […] I suspect a more competitive culture would emerge, with more 
individual focus, if we put names on the rankings. (Chief Controller) 
 
It’s remarkable, this human drive to be the best. I think it’s an amazing thing to have in an 
organization, because people want to succeed and that in itself is an important driver of 
performance. The fact that people want to succeed is a driver that we should take care of. 
You must never take away the feeling of being allowed to be the best. (Director, C&M) 
However, transparency through sharing best practices is not without challenges, and the 
dissemination of how “high performers” perform versus “low performers” is received with 
mixed emotions. For instance, best practice becomes mechanistic and potentially coercive, as 
identified best practices are expected to be performed every time. This undermines flexibility 
and individual empowerment as it turns best practice into a checklist: 
Best practice customer activity involves the key steps of the advisory processes. It’s a 
checklist. You need to make sure that you have a good dialogue with the customer, and that 
means following the identified steps in the best practice processes. We want the financial 
advisors to perform that standard every time. (Director, HR) 
Even though management suspected a more individualistic and competitive culture if rankings 
were fully transparent (showing names on rankings), it is not lost on them that rankings inspire 
some competition. Management is mindful about how these rankings are deliberately designed 
to apply some performance pressure, without overshooting and inspire unhealthy competition: 
It [anonymous rankings] seems much more constructive to give you an idea of where you 
fit in the total picture, and I think that is a sufficient pressure to perform for most people. 
(Chief Controller) 
Incompatible intuitions about employees and their ability, and motivation, to seek performance 
data to self-regulate behavior emerge. This demonstrates how transparency through sharing of 




design feature in which individuals find inspiration to novel ways of executing tasks. Rather 
than inspiring financial advisors to become the best, transparency of relative positioning versus 
high performers also leads to low self-confidence and feelings of failure. Financial advisors are 
demotivated by the rankings and feel that they can never be good enough: 
The challenge here is to get the one from the lower end to feel comfortable discussing their 
performance levels openly with the ones who are top performers. How do they perceive 
these meetings, if they week after week are the only ones in need of help? (Director, HR) 
 
In PERFORM, we are measured against the top 20 performers, but regardless of how good 
you perform compared with your previous achievements, no matter how much you have 
developed your own performance, you have red lines and squares all over the screen. And 
I find that highly demotivating. It is demotivating because I cannot reach that level, the 
level of top 20, no matter how well I perform in terms of myself. I am not good enough. It 
feels a bit like playing in the Minor League and being judged by Major League standards. 
(Financial Advisor, Branch X) 
Middle managers in BB Finance deal with individual feelings of shortcoming by shifting focus 
from individual performance targets to team performance targets, and it is the middle managers 
who take responsibility for reinstating confidence with the financial advisors: 
It is the performance of the entire team – always the team that I focus on. I focus on what 
we can achieve together as a team and how we can support each other in performing in the 
best possible way. (Branch Manager, Branch X) 
 
I am super focused on team level and how we can reach our targets together, by making 
everyone the best version of themselves. (Branch Manager, Branch Z) 
With an aggregated team-based usage of PERFORM, transparency is also less controversial. 
The individuals in BB Finance see competition between business units and branches as much 




We have a huge focus on full transparency at the branch level because we believe that it 
motivates. I mean, we have for example seen that Branch X is very focused on beating 
Branch Y. (Director, C&M) 
A very useful insight that emerges from the material is that managers’ cultivation of 
performance signals and feedback makes the system work better. This takes away the self-
management component, as financial advisors themselves no longer actively seek feedback but 
receive this from middle management. However, it allows managers to use the system in a 
different way than what was intended. Thus, middle managers are enabled to repair flaws in the 
system and restore performance-enhancing transparency: 
Do you produce competition, or are you building a team? I think it is important to have a 
high degree of openness with regards to numbers, results, and what people achieve. For 
example, I read out loud what the customers score and write in the customer feedback. And 
that is something that should be confidential in PERFORM. (Branch Manager, Branch Y) 
Thus, design features that were put in place to reduce variance “between the best and the rest” 
(from internal presentation) end up being modified by managers to deal with the unhealthy 
comparison of individuals, ultimately addressing the unintended consequences of the intended 
enabling design characteristics such as demotivation and unhealthy peer pressure. Even though 
this shows how transparency was initially made sense of as something that promoted adverse 
behavior, the intervention from managers allows individuals to revise their perceptions of 
transparency at work. This is “solved” outside of the system, and once again illustrates the 
difficulties of designing systems for self-management, even when emphasizing enabling design 
features. 
4.6. Making Sense of Self-Management 
The previous sections showed how the introduction of self-management via the control system 




clear boundaries, and how transparency and the sharing of best practices increased peer pressure 
and other social controls. This section presents the findings concerned with the unintended 
consequences of intended enabling control elements. 
Through PERFORM, BB Finance set out to design and implement a performance 
measurement system in an enabling way. The system would facilitate self-management and 
improve employee performance. However, the PMS design choice is contested in the branches. 
Often, financial advisors were found to lack motivation or competence in interpreting and 
acting upon performance information from the system: 
Since we started with the system, there was an implied expectation that financial advisors 
would be active participants in performing self-management on their own initiative. That 
is not what is happening. I, as a manager, need to go in and facilitate this process quite a 
lot. (Branch Manager, Branch X) 
Moreover, financial advisors found the new system to result in more work and less value. 
Financial advisors perceive the endowment of autonomy as demotivating, the responsibility to 
be stressful, and the continuous performance feedback as “nagging” and frustrating: 
It requires a lot of extra work. The workload has increased since we started with 
PERFORM, due to all the meetings, logging, and the self-manager [IT system]. I preferred 
how it was before. (Financial Advisor, Branch Z) 
 
The more time we spend in these systems, logging, and reporting, the less time I have with 
the customers. (Financial Advisor, Branch Y) 
One of the branch managers laughs as they explain how they must push self-management onto 
financial advisors: 
Well, actually, the self-manager [PERFORM] is going under the nickname “nagging”. This 
is a general sentiment in my branch. In the Monday meetings, they [financial advisors] feel 
we just sit and repeat the same. They don’t contribute with any experiences. (Branch 




The company soon realized that by distributing these management tasks to the employees, 
management and their tasks had to be redefined as well. After a while, BB Finance argues that 
management is the key in the self-managed PMS, as the manager is seen as a crucial facilitator 
in enabling self-managed employees. The managers facilitate the individuals in focusing effort 
and providing performance feedback in productive ways. In the company, the concept of 
coaching is introduced as a management task and competence, and top management 
communicates a clear distinction between management (control-based) and coaching 
(development-based). Thus, BB Finance moves from management control to developmental 
control. 
Furthermore, the ambition to tone down the role of management is not realized 
according to plan. Instead, branch managers are validating the employees’ efforts and 
performance, because the (allegedly) unbiased performance feedback from the system is not 
considered to be sufficient. Even those that self-manage want to be acknowledged by their 
manager, not just through a system or from a peer: 
Of course, there are quite a few who are fairly self-managed and perform some sort of self-
management. But every single one of them wants to hear from me that what they do is good 
enough. And if they don’t get that, they want feedback from someone else. Acknowledging 
that I see them and what they do well. So, self-management… It does not really work to 
manage yourself, because we all want to be seen and acknowledged by others. To me, self-
management is a relationship between manager and employee. (Branch Manager, Branch 
X) 
As the previous quote shows, local managers are still essential to good performance 
management, and simply designing enabling characteristics into the performance measurement 
system is not sufficient. In isolation from management, employees make sense of the enabling 
characteristics of the system as more work, less knowledge sharing, standardization, and 




manifest themselves in practice and the unintended consequences that follow. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Findings 
5. Concluding Discussion 
This paper set out to study how managers and employees make sense of enabling control 
elements in an organization that is implementing a Beyond Budgeting-inspired performance 
measurement system. The BB philosophy posits an alternative view to traditional management 
control, most notably in its opposition towards annual budgets and the command-and-control 
management model. Budgets are claimed to be inflexible, outdated, and of little value for 
decision-making, and BB contends that autonomous, empowered and self-regulating 
employees will improve performance (Bogsnes, 2009, 2013; Bunce et al., 1995; Ekholm & 
Wallin, 2000). 
Since the introduction of the enabling/coercive formalization dichotomy (Adler & 
Borys, 1996) was introduced to accounting (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004), accounting scholars 
have explored the characteristics of control through this lens (e.g., Doornich et al., 2019; 
Henttu-Aho, 2016; Jordan & Messner, 2012; Jørgensen & Messner, 2009; O’Grady, 2019). 
Extant research on enabling performance measures may be interpreted as somewhat 
functionalistic, as it focuses on systems or measures intended to facilitate employee initiative, 
flexibility, and responsibility (Groen et al., 2012). The underlying assumption in papers on 
enabling control elements appears to be normative, in the sense that enabling control systems 




2008). Still, the message from Adler and Borys (1996) was that these design characteristics are 
evaluated based on user perception. 
Our study investigates the design and use of a PMS built around the idea of self-
management, and we evaluate the consequences for management and employees. The main 
contribution of this study is that it may be difficult, and indeed conceptually impossible, to 
design complete enabling formalizations. This is primarily because the evaluation of whether a 
control system is enabling or coercive hinges upon the individual perception of the control 
elements within a given system (Adler & Borys, 1996). Adler and Borys (1996) specifically 
called for research on individual differences in perception, but the ensuing accounting literature 
has somewhat ignored this aspect and taken a rather functionalistic turn, in which the “perfect” 
enabling system exists and can be designed. Further, our paper finds that unintended 
consequences of autonomy, flexibility, and transparency in several ways. The following 
sections will show how tensions may arise when balancing autonomy and cooperation 
(Hackman, 1986; Van der Kolk et al., 2020), the problems with designing flexibility 
(Cuganesan & Free, 2020), the potential demotivational aspects of transparency (Barker, 1993; 
O’Grady, 2019), as well as a broader discussion on how the perception of control elements 
differs across individuals in an organization (Cuganesan & Free, 2020; Jordan & Messner, 
2012). 
5.1. Empowerment – Balancing Autonomy and Cooperation 
First, as the financial advisors in BB Finance express, we find that not everyone wants to self-
manage. Increased individual autonomy increases personal responsibility, and operational 
employees may be uncomfortable with this. Lewis et al. (2019, p. 488) characterized “the 
tension between control and empowerment as a paradox”. In line with this, our interviews 




to the findings in Van der Kolk et al. (2020), the increased focus on self-management hampered 
collaboration in BB Finance, leading financial advisors to reduce communication with peers. 
Hence, our findings are in stark contrast to Hackman’s (1986) criteria for self-management, 
where self-managed individuals seek guidance in the organization and help others improve their 
performance. Thus, the financial advisors fail to display self-managed behavior and the control 
elements did not achieve the intended outcomes. 
5.2. Flexibility – Quality and Compliance 
Second, we find that with flexibility comes previously inaccessible opportunities for shirking 
and slack. As individuals are given the freedom to self-evaluate, this flexibility may be used to 
define a favorable set of performance criteria for the individual. This leads management to 
quickly define clear boundaries (i.e., the threshold targets) within which the individual is 
expected to self-manage. In BB Finance, this delimited flexibility leads employees to question 
the sincerity in the organization’s trust in their employees. The system is only flexible as long 
as employees play by the predefined rules, and there is little to no opportunity to repair flaws 
in the system itself. In BB Finance, the organization fails to design flexible control elements, 
as it means different things to different people. Without the ability to repair on an individual 
level, the system moves towards coercive formalization, much like Cuganesan and Free (2020) 
observe in their study. After some time, BB Finance can repair some of the flaws in the system, 
but only through middle management, which contradicts the original purpose of financial 
advisors becoming self-managed. 
5.3. Transparency – Best Practice and Demotivation 
Our third finding is that transparency diminishes the value of autonomy and flexibility as peer 




the key to success. Transparency through sharing of best practice undermines the course of 
executing, monitoring, and managing work processes autonomously, as external reference 
points (i.e., outside the self) serve to guide an individual (or group of individuals) towards a 
familiar performance standard (i.e., the benchmark). Rather, the sharing of best practice inspires 
internal competition and lateral comparison, which may indeed be good for performance, even 
though it constrains the autonomy of the employee. Some employees find transparency to be 
demotivating, as it becomes clear that they will never be “good enough”. Similar to Barker 
(1993), we too find that rational rules and transparency lead to peer pressure which creates new 
“iron cages” for organizational members. 
5.4. Enabling Whom? 
Our study has illustrated how an organization made attempts at implementing enabling control 
elements in a radically decentralized setting. As Jordan and Messner (2012) and Cuganesan and 
Free (2020) discuss how swings between enabling and coercive forms of control may be a 
temporal issue, we propose that these inconsistencies may co-exist across individuals and 
hierarchical levels at the same point in time. Further, Burney et al. (2017) report that most 
previous research sees enabling as good and coercive as bad, yet our case illustrated how 
enabling characteristics in some cases are perceived as unwanted and “nagging”. The system 
cannot provide the emotional support and validation of individual effort to the extent that a 
manager is able to. This leads to an interesting avenue for future researchers to explore; under 
which conditions will different characteristics of an enabling system be perceived as enabling, 
and when will they be perceived as coercive? 
In BB Finance, it appears that middle managers intervene to help employees make sense 
of what these features of the system mean for their work. When the system is perceived to be 




coordinate action. The system may very well be enabling middle managers in their work, but it 
failed to empower individual employees as self-managed workers. Thus, the most surprising 
finding in our research is perhaps that the project, which at the outset appeared to marginalize 
middle management, ended up as a reinforcement of middle management’s power, and their 
role as coaches in the organization. 
Our case illustrated how it may be difficult to design and implement an enabling PMS 
because enabling design characteristics may still be perceived as coercive. The study does not 
reject the notion of enabling management control overall, but it demonstrates the difficulties in 
anticipating user perceptions ex-ante. Therefore, to succeed with enabling systems in settings 
of extreme decentralization, we propose that the development of such systems must proceed in 
increments with continuous testing of beliefs about how users perceive (and use) design 
features. This may require subsequent revisions of the system to align with the user base. 
In BB Finance, strictly bounded autonomy over work processes existed, and the image 
of the totally free and self-managed employee may never amount to anything more than a 
mirage. This is not to say that such systems cannot exist, but that a supply-side diffusion of 
enabling formalizations is conceptually difficult, if not impossible. On the other hand, it is hard 
to imagine that an organization totally free from external control is realistic. Thus, the paradox 
of (strictly) bounded self-management may exist due to the presence of a trust-based leadership 
philosophy which employs control-based administrative actions. A PMS based on the BB 
philosophy runs the risk of sending ambiguous signals (i.e., a signal dissonance), which 
potentially affects the perceived sincerity of empowerment initiatives. 
Our case study discovered that where financial advisors were previously accountable 
for their actions within the boundaries of the system (and to their manager), they are now 




how increased individual autonomy may lead to increased personal responsibility, and the 
consequences of this for management control. 
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Appendix A: List of Interviews 
Position Unit Duration (hours) 
Director (PM) Top Management 1.5 
Head of Risk Management Top Management 1.5 
Director (C&M) Top Management 2; 1.5; 1*; 1.5; 1.5 
Chief Controller (Corporate) Top Management 1.5; 1; 1.5; 1*; 1.5 
Internal Consultant (Corporate) Top Management 1.5; 1 
Director (HR) Top Management 1 
Director of Performance Management Top Management 1* 
Branch Manager, Branch X Middle Management 1.5; 1.5; 1*; 2 
Regional Manager (A) Middle Management 1.5; 1* 
Branch Manager, Branch Y Middle Management 1.5; 1.5; 2; 2; 2 
Regional Manager (B) Middle Management 1 
Branch Manager, Branch Z Middle Management 1.5; 1.5; 1*; 0.5 
Financial Advisor, Branch X Operational level 1.5; 1.5 
Financial Advisor, Branch X Operational level 1.5; 1* 
Financial Advisor, Branch Y Operational level 1.5; 1 
Financial Advisor, Branch Y Operational level 1.5 
Financial Advisor, Branch Y Operational level 1 
Financial Advisor, Branch Y Operational level 1.5; 1 
Financial Advisor, Branch Y Operational level 1.5 
Financial Advisor, Branch Y Operational level 1 
Financial Advisor, Branch Y Operational level 1.5 
Financial Advisor, Branch Y Operational level 1 
Financial Advisor, Branch Z Operational level 1; 1.5 
Financial Advisor, Branch Z Operational level 1.5; 1.5 




Financial Advisor, Branch Z Operational level 1 
Financial Advisor, Branch Z Operational level 1.5 
Financial Advisor, Branch Z Operational level 1 
Financial Advisor, Branch Z Operational level 1.5 
Total (approx.) 55 interviews 74.5 hours 
* = Phone Interview 
 
